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Abstract. Only very little is known about the automatic analysis of
cryptographic protocols for game-theoretic security properties. In this
paper, we therefore study decidability and complexity of the model check-
ing problem for AMC-formulas over infinite state concurrent game struc-
tures induced by cryptographic protocols and the Dolev-Yao intruder.
We show that the problem is NEXPTIME-complete when making rea-
sonable assumptions about protocols and for an expressive fragment of
AMC, which contains, for example, all properties formulated by Kremer
and Raskin in fair ATL for contract-signing and non-repudiation proto-
cols. We also prove that our assumptions on protocols are necessary to
obtain decidability.
1 Introduction
The design of cryptographic protocols is highly error-prone as these protocols
have to achieve their security goals even in presence of an adversary who con-
trols part of the communication network and in presence of dishonest parties
who deviate from the protocol specification. Rigorous analysis of these protocols
is therefore indispensable. Several algorithms and tools for the (fully) automatic
analysis of cryptographic protocols have been developed and successfully applied
(see, e.g., [19, 3]). One of the fundamental results in the area is that the security
of protocols can be decided for a bounded number of sessions and w.r.t. the so-
called Dolev-Yao intruder, with no restrictions put on the size of messages (see,
e.g., [21, 19, 5]). However, these results are restricted to reachability properties,
such as secrecy and authentication. They do not apply to cryptographic proto-
cols with more complex, game-theoretic security requirements, such as those for
non-repudiation and contract-signing protocols, including, for example, different
versions of fairness, timeliness, balance, and abuse-freeness (see, e.g., [17, 16]).
For instance, one version of fairness for non-repudiation protocols taken from
[17] requires that (dishonest) Bob does not have a strategy (in collaboration
with certain communication channels) to reach a state in which he has a proof
of origin but (honest) Alice does not have a strategy (against the other players)
to obtain her proof of receipt.
Only recently a first decidability result for a specific game-theoretic security
property, namely balance, has been obtained [14, 12] (see the related work). The
goal of the present work is to study decidability and complexity of cryptographic
protocol analysis in a much more general setting in which game-theoretic security
properties are expressed in terms of the Alternating-time µ-Calculus (AMC),
which strictly contains ATL∗, and hence, provided a suitable set of propositional
variables, also fair ATL [2].
More precisely, in this paper we formalize the possible executions of proto-
cols along with the Dolev-Yao intruder in terms of a certain class of infinite-state
concurrent game structures [2], which we call security-specific concurrent game
structures. These concurrent game structures have an infinite state space since
at every execution step the Dolev-Yao intruder can choose messages to be sent to
principals among an infinite set of possible messages. Similar to [15], we model
the realistic situation that (honest and dishonest) principals may take actions at
the same time and may receive/write several messages from/to other principals
at the same time. Since many cryptographic protocols with game-theoretic se-
curity requirements assume resilient channels (also called secure channels here),
i.e., channels that, unlike the network, are not under the control of the Dolev-
Yao intruder, our model comprises such channels. We distinguish between direct
and scheduled secure channels: A direct secure channel is a direct link between
principals. Messages sent on scheduled secure channels are first sent to a buffer
before being delivered to the intended recipient. The buffer is a player in the
security-specific concurrent game structure and may team up with (honest or
dishonest) principals or other scheduled secure channels, as can be specified by
an AMC-formula. Honest principals are specified by finite edge-labeled trees
where an edge is labeled by a rule which describes a possible receive-send action
of a principal at the current step. Vertices in these trees may have self-loops to
allow a principal to stay in the current state.
Based on the security-specific concurrent game structures that we define,
game-theoretic security requirements for protocols can conveniently be expressed
in terms of AMC-formulas (or alternatively, ATL∗-formulas). In order to de-
cide whether a given protocol satisfies a given security property, expressed as
AMC-formula, one has to decide the AMC-model checking problem over the
security-specific concurrent game structures, where the input to the problem is
the protocol (which together with the Dolev-Yao intruder induces the security-
specific concurrent game structure) and the AMC-formula.
Our main technical results are as follows: We show that the above model
checking problem is undecidable for a class of protocols in which honest prin-
cipals may be what we call non-greedy, i.e., they may ignore received messages
even though they conform to the protocol specification. The undecidability result
holds for a relatively simple, fixed AMC-formula. Fortunately, in typical proto-
col specifications, honest principals are greedy, i.e., they do not ignore messages
that conform to the protocol specification. Hence, requiring honest principals
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to be greedy is reasonable from a practical point of view. We also exhibit an-
other source of undecidability, namely protocols that involve scheduled secure
channels from the Dolev-Yao intruder (i.e., dishonest principals) to honest prin-
cipals. This undecidability result holds for greedy principals and again a fixed,
simple AMC-formula. Since we allow the Dolev-Yao intruder to sent messages
over direct secure channels to principals, disallowing scheduled secure channels
from the Dolev-Yao intruder to honest principals does not limit the power of the
intruder. These undecidability results show that to obtain decidability it is nec-
essary to consider only protocols with greedy principals and without scheduled
secure channels from the Dolev-Yao intruder to honest principals. For this class
of protocols we indeed obtain decidability, more accurately (co-)NEXPTIME-
completeness, of the model checking problem for an expressive fragment of AMC,
consisting of what we call I-positive (I-negative) AMC-formulas, where I is the
name of the Dolev-Yao intruder in the concurrent game structure. An AMC-
formula ϕ is I-positive if all subformulas of ϕ of the form 〈〈A〉〉 dψ with I ∈ A fall
under an even number of negations and all subformulas of ϕ of the form 〈〈A〉〉 dψ
with I 6∈ A fall under an odd number of negations; a formula is I-negative if its
negation is I-positive. We subsume the set of I-positive and I-negative formulas
under the notion I-monotone formulas. The same terminology can be applied to
ATL∗-formulas. It is easy to see that the property of being I-positive/-negative
is invariant under the translation from ATL∗ to AMC as described in [2]. Kre-
mer and Raskin were the first to express game-theoretic security properties in
terms of fair ATL [17, 16]. It turns out that all the properties that they have
formulated, including for instance various forms of fairness, timeliness, balance,
and abuse-freeness, fall into the I-monotone fragment of ATL∗, and hence, the
I-monotone fragment of AMC, indicating that the I-monotone fragment suffices
for most properties of interest.
The complexity upper bound is proved by a novel combination of techniques
from the theory of infinite games, such as parity games and memoryless strate-
gies, and techniques from cryptographic protocol analysis for reachability prop-
erties.
Related work. In [24, 17, 16], specific protocols have been analyzed w.r.t. game-
theoretic security properties using the finite-state model checkers Murphi and
MOCHA, where in [17, 16] several game-theoretic properties have been formu-
lated in fair ATL. The disadvantage of using finite-state model checking is that
the Dolev-Yao intruder has to be approximated and actions of dishonest princi-
pals have to be anticipated to some extent. The present work shows that fully au-
tomated analysis of game-theoretic security requirements is possible also w.r.t. a
fine-grained infinite-state model and the standard Dolev-Yao intruder.
As already mentioned, a first decidability result for a specific security prop-
erty, namely balance, was proved in [14] (see also [12] for a constraint-based
algorithm). The present work considerably generalizes [14, 12] in terms of the se-
curity properties that can be checked, as here we consider a comprehensive class
of security properties, expressed as I-monotone AMC-formulas. Also, unlike [14,
12], the present work contains undecidability and (tight) complexity-theoretic re-
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sults. Finally, following [7], [14, 12] use a model with interleaving semantics, and
hence, unlike our real concurrent model, at every time only one principal may
be active and a principal can only receive/send one message at a time.
In [9], Corin et al. proposed a procedure for deciding trace-based properties in
a variant of LTL with only past temporal operators. While they cannot express
game-theoretic security properties, it seems that the (trace-based) properties
they have formulated in their logic can also be formulated in the I-monotone
fragment of AMC. Complexity-theoretic results are not provided by Corin et
al. and they consider a model with interleaving semantics, rather than real con-
currency.
Structure of this paper. In the next section, we recall the definition of con-
current game structures and AMC and present parity games for AMC-model
checking. The security-specific model that we use, in particular the infinite-state
concurrent game structures induced by protocols and the Dolev-Yao intruder are
introduced in Section 3. The main results are summarized in Section 4. In Sec-
tion 5, we illustrate the kind of properties that can be expressed in the fragment
of AMC that we consider. The proofs of the main theorems are then presented
in Section 6 to 8. We conclude in Section 9.
2 AMC and Parity Games
Following [1, 2], in this section we recall the definition of concurrent game struc-
tures and AMC. We also introduce parity games for AMC-model checking.
2.1 Concurrent Game Structures
Our definition of a concurrent game structure differs from the one in [2] in two
aspects: First, the structures that we consider may have an infinite state space
and in one state players may have an infinite number of possible moves. Second,
while in [2] a move of a player is identified with a natural number, in our setting
it is more convenient to allow arbitrary values; in the context of cryptographic
protocol moves will be vertices of trees and terms.
We define concurrent game structures as follows. A concurrent game structure
(CGS) is a tuple S = 〈Σ,Q,P, π,∆, δ〉 where
– Σ is a non-empty, finite set of players,
– Q is a (possibly infinite) set of states,
– P is a finite set of propositional variables/propositions,
– π : Q → 2P is a labeling function (which assigns every state to the set of
propositions true in this state),
– ∆ is a function which for each state q ∈ Q and each player a ∈ Σ returns a
(possibly infinite) set ∆(q, a) of moves available at state q to player a.
For A ⊆ Σ and q ∈ Q, an (A, q)-move is a function c which maps every
a ∈ A to a move c(a) ∈ ∆(q, a). Given A ⊆ Σ and a state q, we write ∆A(q)
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for the set of (A, q)-moves. An (A, q)-move is called a partial move if A 6= Σ,
and a total move if A = Σ.
– δ is a transition function which, for each state q and each total move c ∈
∆Σ(q), returns a state δ(q, c) ∈ Q (the state obtained when in state q all
players simultaneously perform their moves according to c).
A computation of S is an infinite sequence λ = q0, q1, . . . of states such that for
each i ≥ 0, the state qi+1 is a successor of qi, i.e., qi+1 = δ(qi, c) for some total
move c ∈ ∆Σ(qi). We call λ a q-computation if q0 = q. We refer to the ith state
qi in λ by λ[i], to the sequence qi, qi+1, . . . , qj by λ[i, j], and to the sequence
qi, qi+1, . . . by λ[i,∞].
Let c ∈ ∆A(q) and c′ ∈ ∆A
′
(q) for A,A′ ⊆ Σ and q ∈ Q with A ⊆ A′. We
write c ⊑ c′ if c(a) = c′(a) for every a ∈ A. For a state q, a set of players A ⊆ Σ,
and an (A, q)-move c ∈ ∆A(q), we say that a state q′ ∈ Q is a c–successor of q
if there is a total move c′ ∈ ∆Σ(q) with c ⊑ c′ and q′ = δ(q, c′).
2.2 AMC
Following [1, 2], we now recall the definition of the alternating µ-calculus (AMC).
Syntax of AMC-Formulas. An AMC-formula over the set P of propositions,
the set V of variables, and the set Σ of players is one of the following:
– p ∈ P,
– X ∈ V ,
– ¬ϕ if ϕ is an AMC-formula,
– ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 if ϕ1 and ϕ2 are AMC-formulas,
– 〈〈A〉〉 dϕ if A ⊆ Σ and ϕ is an AMC-formula,
– µX.ϕ if ϕ is an AMC-formula and all free occurrences of X (i.e., those that
do not occur in a subformula of ϕ starting with µX) fall under an even
number of negations.
We use the following common abbreviations: JAK dϕ = ¬〈〈A〉〉 d¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ =
¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), and νX.ϕ = ¬µX.¬ϕ[X/¬X ] where ϕ[X/¬X ] is obtained from ϕ
by replacing every free occurrence of X in ϕ by ¬X and vice versa. Using these
abbreviations we can write every AMC-formula in negation normal form (also
called positive normal form). An AMC-formula is in negation normal form if
every negation symbol only occurs immediately in front of a proposition or a
variable.
An AMC-formula is a sentence if it does not contain free variables, i.e., all
variables are bounded by a fixed-point operator.
The size of an AMC-formula ϕ, denoted |ϕ|, is defined inductively in the
obvious way.
Semantics of AMC-Formulas. To define the semantics of AMC-formulas,
we first need some definitions and notations. Given a game structure S =
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〈Σ,Q,P, π,∆, δ〉, a valuation F is a function from the set of variables V to
2Q, i.e., subsets of Q. For F , a variable X , and a set M ⊆ Q, we denote by
F [X := M ] the valuation that maps X to M and agrees with F on all other
variables.
An AMC-formula ϕ is interpreted as a mapping ϕS from valuations to state
sets. Intuitively, ϕS(F ) denotes the set of states in which ϕ is satisfied under
the valuation F in the structure S. The mapping ϕS is defined inductively as
follows:
– pS(F ) = {q ∈ Q | p ∈ π(q)} for p ∈ P.
– XS(F ) = F (X) for X ∈ V .
– (¬ϕ)S(F ) = Q \ ϕS(F ).
– (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)S(F ) = ϕS1 (F ) ∪ ϕ
S
2 (F ).
– (〈〈A〉〉 dϕ)S(F ) = {q ∈ Q | there exists c ∈ ∆A(q) such that for every c′ ∈
∆Σ(q) with c ⊑ c′ we have δ(q, c′) ∈ ϕS(F )}.
– (µX.ϕ)S(F ) =
⋂
{M ⊆ Q|ϕS(F [X := M ]) ⊆ M}, i.e., (µX.ϕ)S(F ) is the
least fixed-point of the function that mapsM ⊆ Q to ϕS(F [X := M ]). (Note
that this function is monotonic.)
Note that if ϕ is a sentence, then the interpretation of ϕ in the structure S is
uniquely determined independently of a valuation function F . In fact, ϕS(F ) =
ϕS(F ′) for all valuation functions F and F ′, i.e., ϕS is a constant mapping. We
therefore simply write ϕS instead of ϕS(F ) for some F .
Given a state q of a CGS S and a sentence ϕ, we write
(S, q) |= ϕ
if q ∈ ϕS .
Deciding (S, q) |= ϕ for a given finitely represented CGS S, a state q in S,
and a sentence ϕ is an AMC-model checking problem. The main purpose of this
paper is to study this problem for a class of CGSs induced by cryptographic
protocols.
We note that AMC is more expressive than ATL∗ (and hence, ATL).
Theorem 1. [2] AMC is more expressive than ATL∗, and hence, provided a
suitable set of propositional variables, also more expressive than fair ATL. The
alternation-free fragment of AMC is more expressive than ATL.
2.3 Parity Games and AMC-Model Checking
In this section, we first recall the definition of parity games and then, similar to
the case of modal µ-calculus, associate with every CGS S, state q, and AMC-
sentence ϕ a parity game in which player 0 has a winning strategy iff (S, q) |= ϕ.
Parity Games. Following [11], we now recall the definition of parity games.
A parity game G is a tuple (V, V0, V1, E, vI , l) where V is a (possibly infinite)
set of vertices partitioned into sets V0 and V1 (i.e., V0∪V1 = V and V0∩V1 = ∅),
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vI ∈ V (the initial vertex), E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges, and l is a coloring
function from V into the set of colors {0, . . . ,m}, for some natural number m,
such that (V,E) is a directed, leafless graph.
The parity game G is played by two players, player 0 and 1. A play of G
starts by putting a token on vertex vI . Now, if in a play a token is put on a
vertex v (initially v = vI) with v ∈ Vi for i ∈ {0, 1}, then player i chooses a
successor v′ of v, i.e., (v, v′) ∈ E, and moves the token to v′. Then, if v′ ∈ Vj ,
for j ∈ {0, 1}, it is player j’s turn to move the token to a successor of v′, and
so on. This continues forever. (Note that by definition of parity games, every
vertex has a successor.) Formally, a play p is an infinite sequence v0, v1, v2, . . . ,
of vertices such that v0 = vI and (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for every i ≥ 0. The play p is
winning for player 0 if the maximum color occurring infinitely often in p, i.e.,
the color max{k | k occurs infinitely often in the sequence l(v0), l(v1), . . .}, is
even. Otherwise, the play is winning for player 1.
A strategy f of player i is a function that for every finite prefix of a play,
ending in a vertex v ∈ Vi, selects a successor v′ of v, i.e., (v, v′) ∈ E. A play
v0, v1, . . . is consistent with f , if for each n such that vn ∈ Vi, we have vn+1 =
f(v0, v1, . . . , vn). A strategy of player i is winning, if each play consistent with
this strategy is winning for player i.
A strategy is memoryless (or positional), if it depends only on the last vertex,




1, . . . , v
′
n′ are prefixes of plays with vn = v
′
n′ , then




1, . . . , v
′
n′). We therefore often represent a memoryless
strategy of player i by a function from Vi to V such that, for each v ∈ Vi, if
f(v) = v′, then (v, v′) ∈ E. A memoryless strategy f of player i in a parity game
G induces a subgraph of (V,E) where all outgoing edges of vertices v ∈ Vi are
deleted except for the edge to f(v). We call this graph a strategy graph of player i
or the strategy graph of player i induced by f . Obviously, f is a winning strategy
for player i iff all infinite paths in the induced strategy graph starting from the
initial vertex vI are winning for player i. We will sometimes assume that strategy
graphs contain only vertices reachable from the initial vertex. Obviously, if such
a graph is winning for player i, then each vertex v in this graph is winning for
player i in the sense that each infinite path in this graph starting in v is winning
for player i.
We summarize well-known and fundamental facts about parity games.
Fact 1 [18, 20, 10] (see also [26]) Parity games are determined, i.e., either player
0 or player 1 has a winning strategy. The player who has a winning strategy has
a memoryless one.
Parity Games for AMC-Model Checking. In this section, we associate
with every CGS S, state q0 of S, and AMC-sentence ϕ in negation normal
form a parity game Gϕ(S,q0) such that player 0 wins G
ϕ
(S,q0)
iff (S, q0) |= ϕ. Our
construction follows that of modal µ-calculus (see, e.g., [25, 11]) and is similar to
the one in [23]. However, instead of first turning ϕ into an equivalent alternating
parity tree automaton and then using this tree automaton to obtain the parity
game, we construct the parity game directly from ϕ and S.
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Throughout the rest of this section, let S = 〈Σ,Q,P, π,∆, δ〉 be a concurrent
game structure, q0 ∈ Q be a state in S, and ϕ be an AMC-sentence in nega-
tion normal form. We assume, w.l.o.g., that for each variable X in ϕ there is
exactly one subformula of the form µX.ψ or νX.ψ in ϕ. (This can obviously be
guaranteed by renaming variables.) We refer to this subformula by ϕX .
In what follows, we refer to subformulas of ϕ by standard subformulas. Now,
given S, q ∈ Q, and ϕ, we define the set SubqS(ϕ) to consist of the following
(standard and non-standard) subformulas of ϕ:
(a) ψ for every standard subformula ψ of ϕ,
(b) 2cψ for every standard subformula 〈〈A〉〉 dψ of ϕ and c ∈ ∆A(q),
(c) 3cψ for every standard subformula JAK dψ of ϕ and c ∈ ∆
A(q).
We will call elements of SubqS(ϕ) subformulas of ϕ where, as mentioned, the
formulas in (a) are called standard subformulas of ϕ and those in (b) and (c)
are called nonstandard subformulas of ϕ. Note that 3c and 2c occur only as top
symbols of subformulas; they are not nested.
Now, the parity game Gϕ(S,q0) = (V, V0, V1, E, vI , l) for S, q0, and ϕ is defined
as follows (see below for a brief discussion of the differences to the construction
for the model µ-calculus): The set V of vertices consists of all tuples of the form
(q, ψ) where q ∈ Q and ψ ∈ SubqS(ϕ). The initial vertex vI is (q0, ϕ). The set
V0 consists of vertices of the form (q, ψ) where q ∈ Q and ψ is of one of the
following forms:
ψ′ ∨ ψ′′, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ′, 3cψ
′.
All remaining vertices belong to V1. The set E of edges is the smallest set satis-
fying the following conditions:
– ( (q, p) , (q, p) ) ∈ E for every (q, p) ∈ V .
– ( (q,¬p) , (q,¬p) ) ∈ E for every (q,¬p) ∈ V .
– ( (q,X) , (q, ϕX) ) ∈ E for every (q,X) ∈ V .
– ( (q, µX.ψ) , (q, ψ) ) ∈ E for every (q, µX.ψ) ∈ V .
– ( (q, νX.ψ) , (q, ψ) ) ∈ E for every (q, νX.ψ) ∈ V .
– ( (q, (ψ ∨ ψ′)) , (q, ψ) ) ∈ E and ( (q, (ψ ∨ ψ′)) , (q, ψ′) ) ∈ E for every
(q, (ψ ∨ ψ′)) ∈ V .
– ( (q, (ψ ∧ ψ′)) , (q, ψ) ) ∈ E and ( (q, (ψ ∧ ψ′)) , (q, ψ′) ) ∈ E for every
(q, (ψ ∧ ψ′)) ∈ V .
– ( (q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ) , (q,2cψ) ) ∈ E for every (q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ) ∈ V and c ∈ ∆A(q).
– ( (q, JAK dψ) , (q,3cψ) ) ∈ E for every (q, JAK dψ) ∈ V and c ∈ ∆A(q).
– ( (q,2cψ) , (q
′, ψ) ) ∈ E for every (q,2cψ) ∈ V and c-successor q′ of q.
– ( (q,3cψ) , (q
′, ψ) ) ∈ E for every (q,3cψ) ∈ V and c-successor q′ of q.
Let ‖ϕ‖ be the depth of ϕ when ϕ is viewed as a syntax tree. The coloring
function l is defined as follows:4 The color of a state s = (q, ψ) is defined as
follows:
4 Using the alternation depth of formulas, one can obtain a coloring function that
assigns smaller colors. This is useful to achieve more efficient algorithms. However,
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– l(s) = 1, if ψ = p and p /∈ π(q) or ψ = ¬p and p ∈ π(q),
– l(s) = 2‖ψ‖, if ψ = νX.ψ′ for some ψ′,
– l(s) = 2‖ψ‖ + 1, if ψ = µX.ψ′ for some ψ′, and
– l(s) = 0 otherwise.
The above definition of Gϕ(S,q0) is similar to the case of modal µ-calculus with
the following difference: In case of the modal µ-calculus, when a play reaches a
position (q, ψ) with ψ of the form 2ψ′ or 3ψ′, then one of the players chooses a
successor q′ of q and the play continues with (q′, ψ). In case of AMC, we have a
family of modal operators 〈〈A〉〉 d and JAK d and when a play reaches a position
(q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ′) or (q, JAK dψ′) then we use an intermediate state before a successor
of q is chosen: first one of the players moves to a position of the form (q,2cψ
′)
or (q,3cψ
′), and then the opponent chooses a successor q′ of q and the play
continues with (q′, ψ′).
Similar to the case of the modal µ-calculus (see, e.g., [25, 11]), one shows the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. For S, q0, and ϕ as above we have that (S, q0) |= ϕ iff player
0 has a (memoryless) winning strategy in the parity game Gϕ(S,q0).
3 Our Protocol and Intruder Model
We now introduce our protocol and intruder model. Similar to [15], we con-
sider a real concurrent communication model in which principals (including the
intruder) may take actions at the same time and may receive/send several mes-
sages at the same time from/to different principals. Principals are connected
via different kinds of channels: network and resilient channels. Instead of the
term “resilient channel”, we often use the term “secure channel”. While network
channels are completely controlled by the intruder, secure channels are not. In
particular, the intruder may not be able to delay or modify messages sent over
such a channel. We will consider two types of secure channels. Those that directly
link to principals (direct secure channels) and those that are buffered (scheduled
secure channels). While messages sent over direct secure channels are immedi-
ately delivered, messages sent over scheduled secure channels are first written
into a buffer. The buffer is an independent agent which can follow its own strat-
egy in delivering messages; it can for example team up with an honest principal
or the intruder. Whether and with whom such a buffer collaborates depends on
the security property considered, as specified by an AMC-formula.
While conceptually the model presented here and the one presented in [15]
are quite similar, the presentation and level of detail varies in the following main
points: First, in [15], no specific formalism for describing honest protocol partic-
ipants was presented. Such participants could be arbitrary I/O components (in
particular, arbitrary interactive, non-deterministic Turing machines). However,
for the complexity results shown in this paper the coloring function employed here
is sufficient.
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since in the present work we are interested in decidability results, we need to
be more precise about the representation and the kind of computation honest
protocol participants are allowed to perform. As defined below, such participants
will be modeled by certain edge-labeled trees. Second, in [15] we considered a
general communication model and described how a system of I/O components
runs. Then, protocol runs and attacks were described in terms of such systems
where every entity (honest protocol participants, the intruder, scheduled secure
channels) was modeled as an I/O component. In the present work, we do not con-
sider systems of I/O components but model protocol runs and attacks directly
in terms of concurrent game structures.
In what follows, we define i) terms and messages, ii) how the intruder can
derive new messages from a given set of messages, iii) principals and protocols,
and iv) concurrent game structures which describe the run of a protocol along
with the intruder.
3.1 Terms and Messages
Let V be a finite set of variables, A be a finite set of atoms (atomic messages),
K be a finite set of public and private keys, and AI be an infinite set of intruder
atoms. These sets are assumed to be pairwise disjoint. Typically, the set A
contains names of principals, atomic symmetric keys, and nonces (i.e., random
numbers generated by principals). The set K is partitioned into a set Kpub of
public keys and a setKpriv of private keys. There is a bijective mapping ·−1 : K →
K which assigns to every public key the corresponding private key and to every
private key its corresponding public key. We note that we will allow non-atomic
symmetric keys as well. The atoms in AI are the nonces, symmetric keys, etc. the
intruder may generate.
The set T of terms is defined as follows:
T ::= V | A | AI | 〈T , T 〉 | {T }
s
T | {T }
a
Kpub
| hash(T ) | sig(Kpub, T )
Terms without variables (i.e., ground terms) are called messages. The set of
messages is denoted by M. As usual, 〈t, t′〉 is the pairing of t and t′, the term
{t}st′ stands for the symmetric encryption of t by t
′ (note that the key t′ may
be any term), {t}ak is the asymmetric encryption of t by k, the term hash(t)
stands for the hash of t, and sig(k, t) is the signature on t (generated using k−1)
which can be verified with the public key k. One could add further cryptographic
primitives, such as private contract signatures (PCSs) as in [14]. While all results
presented in this paper would, for example, carry over to the case with PCSs,
for simplicity of presentation, this and other cryptographic primitives are not
considered.
We define T◦ = T ∪{◦} andM◦ = M∪{◦} where ‘◦’ is a new symbol which
stands for ‘no message’. This symbol will be used in case there is no message on
a channel.
A substitution σ is a mapping from variables to terms where the domain
dom(σ) = {x ∈ V | σ(x) 6= x} of σ is required to be finite and σ(x) ∈ M for
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every x ∈ dom(σ). Given two substitutions σ and σ′ with disjoint domains, their
union σ∪σ′ is defined in the obvious way. Given a term t, the term tσ is obtained
from t by simultaneously substituting each variable x occurring in t by σ(x).
3.2 Derivation of Messages
Given a set K of messages, the (infinite) set d(K) of messages the intruder
can derive from K is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions with
m,m′ ∈ M:
1. K ⊆ d(K).
2. ◦ ∈ d(K).
3. Composition and decomposition: If m,m′ ∈ d(K), then 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(K).
Conversely, if 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(K), then m ∈ d(K) and m′ ∈ d(K).
4. Symmetric encryption and decryption: If m,m′ ∈ d(K), then {m}sm′ ∈ d(K).
Conversely, if {m}sm′ ∈ d(K) and m
′ ∈ d(K), then m ∈ d(K).
5. Asymmetric encryption and decryption: If m ∈ d(K) and k ∈ d(K) ∩ Kpub,
then {m}ak ∈ d(K). Conversely, if {m}
a
k ∈ d(K) and k
−1 ∈ d(K)∩Kpriv , then
m ∈ d(K).
6. Hashing: If m ∈ d(K), then hash(m) ∈ d(K).
7. Signing: If m ∈ d(K), k−1 ∈ d(K)∩Kpriv , then sig(k,m) ∈ K. (The signature
contains the public key but can only be generated if the corresponding private
key is known.)
8. Generating fresh constants : AI ⊆ d(K).
3.3 Channels, Principals, and Protocols
We denote by P the finite set of all principals. This set is partitioned into the set
H of honest and the set D of dishonest principals. All dishonest principals will
be subsumed by the intruder. The behavior of honest principals will be specified
by certain trees (see below). Protocols will basically be defined by a set of such
trees, specifying the behavior of all honest principals participating in a protocol
run. First, we have to define how principals are connected via channels.
Channels and Multi Terms. We consider three types of communication chan-
nels between principals (including the intruder): (1) network channels, (2) direct
secure channels, and (3) scheduled secure channels. Network channels are con-
trolled by the intruder, i.e., every message sent on a network channel by an
honest principal is immediately delivered to the intruder and every message re-
ceived from a network channel was sent by the intruder (who impersonates some
honest or dishonest principal). A direct secure channel is a direct link between
principals, i.e., every message sent on such a channel by some principal to another
principal will immediately be delivered to the latter principal without interven-
tion by the intruder. Messages sent via a scheduled secure channel will first be
sent to a buffer before they are delivered to the intended recipient. Such a buffer
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is an independent player in the concurrent games structures that we consider
and may be controlled or may team up with (honest or dishonest) principals or
other scheduled secure channels. This will be specified by AMC-formulas.
A network channel from a principal a to a principal b such that a 6= b and
not both a and b are dishonest will be denoted by net(a, b). Similarly, we use
dir(a, b) and sch(a, b) to refer to direct and scheduled secure channels from a to
b, respectively. The set of all the channels will be denoted by C.
For sets A,B ⊆ P of principals, we define Net(A,B) = {net(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈
B, a 6= b, and (a ∈ H or b ∈ H)}. Similarly, we define Dir(A,B) and Sch(A,B)
for direct and scheduled secure channels. We define C(A,B) = Net(A,B) ∪
Dir(A,B)∪Sch(A,B). We will write, for example, Net(a,B) instead ofNet({a}, B).
For a set C ⊆ C, we call a mapping r : C → T◦ a multi term and a mapping
r : C → M◦ a multi message. We denote by ch(m) and ch(r) the domain C of
m and r, respectively, and by V(r) the set of variables occurring in the range of
r, i.e., in the set {t | r(c) = t for some c ∈ C}. If σ is a substitution, we denote
by rσ the multi term obtained by substituting every variable x ∈ V(r) occurring
in r by σ(x), i.e., rσ(c) = r(c)σ for every c ∈ C.
Let m be a multi message, r be a multi term, and σ be a substitution with
domain V(r). We say that m matches with r by σ, if ch(r) ⊆ ch(m) and m(c) =
r(c)σ for each c ∈ ch(r). We say thatm matches with r, if there is a substitution
σ such that m matches with r by σ.
Honest Principals. We now define honest principals; more precisely, we should
say ‘instances of honest principals’ since a principal might run several copies of
a protocol in possibly different roles. Informally speaking, an honest principal is
defined by a finite edge-labeled tree which describes the behavior of this principal
in a protocol run. Each edge of such a tree is labeled by a rule which describes the
receive-send action that is performed when the principal takes this edge in a run
of the protocol. As mentioned above, in one receive-send action a principal may
receive/send several messages on different channels. The trees that we consider
may have self-loops. These allow a principal to stay in the same state. When
a principal carries out a protocol, it traverses its tree, starting at the root. In
every node, the principal takes its current input (on all channels the principal has
access to or wants to read), chooses one of the edges leaving the node such that
the current inputs match with the left-hand side of the rule the edge is labeled
with, sends out (possibly different) messages on (possibly different) channels as
determined by the right-hand side of the rule, and moves to the node the chosen
edge leads to. Edges have priorities which influence which edge may be taken
in case several edges are applicable. However, if several edges with the same
priority can be taken, one such edge is picked non-deterministically. Formally,
principals are defined as follows:
For sets C,D ⊆ C, we call r ⇒ s with r : C → T◦ and s : D → T◦ a (C,D)–
rule. For an honest principal a ∈ H, an a–rule is a (C,D)–rule with C ⊆ C(P , a)
and D ⊆ C(a,P). If σ is a substitution and R = (r⇒ s) is a rule, we write Rσ
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to denote the rule obtained by substituting every variable x occurring in R by
σ(x), i.e., Rσ = (rσ ⇒ sσ).
Let a ∈ H be an honest principal. Its behavior is specified by what we call an
a-instance (or simply principal). An a-instance (principal) is defined by a finite
tree P = (V,E, r, ℓp, ℓ) where V is the set of vertices, E is the set of edges, r ∈ V
is the root of the tree, and ℓp maps every edge e ∈ E of P to a natural number,
the priority of this edge. The labeling function ℓ maps every edge e = (v, v′) ∈ E
of P to an a-rule ℓ(e) in such a way that every variable occurring in V(s) with
ℓ(e) = (r ⇒ s) also occurs on the left-hand side of ℓ(e), i.e., in V(r), or on the
left-hand side of a rule on the path from the root r to v. In other words, every
variable occurring on the right-hand side of a rule also occurs on the left-hand
side of this or a preceding rule. Nodes of P may have self-loops, i.e., P may
contain edges of the form e = (v, v) for v ∈ V . In that case, we require that for
ℓ(e) = (r ⇒ s) the domains of r and s are empty, i.e., ch(r) = ∅ and ch(s) = ∅.
In other words, when performing a self-loop, a principal neither reads nor writes
messages from/onto a channel.
For an a-instance P , we denote by ch(P ) the set of all the channels used by
P , i.e., ch(P ) consists of those channels c for which there exists an edge in P
labeled with a rule of the form r⇒ s such that c ∈ ch(r) or c ∈ ch(s).
Protocols. A protocol is a tuple Pr = (H,D,K, {Pa}a∈H) where H and D are
sets of honest and dishonest principals, respectively, Pa is an a-instance for each
a ∈ H, and K is the initial intruder knowledge, i.e., a finite set of messages.
W.l.o.g., we assume that the set of vertices of the trees Pa, a ∈ H, are pairwise
disjoint. For a protocol Pr, we denote by ch(Pr) the set of channels used in Pr,
i.e. the set of all channels c such that c ∈ ch(Pa), for some a ∈ H. The size of
Pr, denoted by |Pr| is defined according to some standard representation of Pr.
3.4 Example: the ASW Two-Party Contract-signing Protocol
Two illustrate the definition of honest principals and protocols introduced above,
we specify the ASW protocol [4] in our model. First, we provide an informal
overview of the protocol.
We write sig[k,m] as abbreviation for 〈m, sig(k,m)〉 and sometimes write
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 instead of 〈m1, 〈m2, 〈· · · 〈mn−1, 〉〉〉〉. We denote the public or ver-
ification key of a principal A by kA.
The ASW protocol enables two principals A (the originator) and B (the
responder) to obtain each other’s signature on a previously agreed contractual
text contract with the help of a trusted third party (TTP) T , which however
is only invoked in case of problems. In other words, the ASW protocol is an
optimistic two-party contract-signing protocol.
There are two kinds of valid contracts: the standard contract
〈sig[kA,mA], NA, sig[kB,mB], NB〉
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and the replacement contract
sig[kT , 〈sig[kA,mA], sig[kB,mB]〉],
wheremA= 〈kA, kB, kT , contract, hash(NA)〉,mB = 〈sig[kA,mA], hash(NB)〉, and
NA and NB are nonces.
The ASW protocol consists of three subprotocols: the exchange, abort, and
resolve protocol. These subprotocols are explained next.
Exchange protocol. The basic idea of the exchange protocol is that A first indi-
cates her interest to sign the contract. To this end, she sends to B the message
sig[kA,mA] as defined above, where NA is a nonce generated by A. By sending
this message, A “commits” to signing the contract. Then, similarly, B indi-
cates his interest to sign the contract by generating a nonce NB and sending
the message sig[kB ,mB] to A. Finally, first A and then B reveal NA and NB,
respectively.
Abort protocol. If, after A has sent her first message, B does not respond, A may
contact T to abort, i.e., A runs the abort protocol with T . Note that A may wait
as long as she wants before contacting T . (In our formal model, this is modeled as
a non-deterministic action of A.) In the abort protocol, A first sends the message
aA = sig[kA, 〈aborted, sig[kA,mA]〉]. If T has not received a resolve request before
(see below), then T sends back to A the abort token aT = sig[kT , 〈aborted, aA〉].
Otherwise (if T received a resolve request, which in particular involves the mes-
sages sig[kA,mA] and sig[kB,mB] from above), it sends the replacement contract
rT = sig[kT , r] to A with r = 〈sig[kA,mA], sig[kB ,mB]〉.
Resolve protocol. If, after A has sent the nonce NA, B does not respond, A may
contact T to resolve, i.e., A runs the resolve protocol with T . Again, A may
wait for as long as she wants before contacting T . In the resolve protocol, A
sends the message r to T . If T has not sent out an abort token before, then T
returns the replacement contract rT , and otherwise T returns the abort token
aT . Analogously, if, after B has sent his commitment to sign the contract, A does
not respond, B may contact T to resolve, i.e., B runs the resolve protocol with T
similarly to the case for A. Note that contacting T is again a non-deterministic
action of B.
We note that the communication with T (for both A and B) is carried out over
secure channels.
Figure 1 and 2 present the formal specifications PA and PT of A and T , re-
spectively. The specification of B can be defined similarly. The specification
of the ASW protocol for the case that A and T are honest but B is dis-
honest (and hence, B’s behavior is determined by the intruder) is the tuple
PrASW = ({A, T }, {B}, {A,B, T, kA, kB , k
−1
B , kT }, {PA, PT }). In Figure 1 and 2
the communication between A and T is modeled by scheduled secure channels
and the communication between B and T by direct secure channels. Note that
allowing (dishonest) B direct communication with T increases his power. To
check certain properties of this protocol, it is useful to add a “watch dog” W as
another honest principal: W checks whether the intruder (B) has a standard or
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∅ ⇒ nAB :me1
sTA :mr2 ⇒ ∅
sTA :ma2 ⇒ ∅
sTA :mr ⇒ ∅
nBA :me2 ⇒ n
A
B :NA
∅ ⇒ sAT :mr1
∅ ⇒ sAT :ma1
[1] [0]
[1][0]




me1 = sig[kA, 〈kA, kB , kT , contract, hash(NA)〉]
me2 = sig[kB , 〈me1, hash(x)〉]
ma1 = sig[kA, 〈abort, me1〉]
ma2 = sig[kT , 〈abort, ma1〉]
mr1 = 〈me1, me2〉
mr2 = sig[kT , mr1]
mr = sig[kT , 〈me1, sig[kB , 〈me1, y〉]〉]
Fig. 1. Honest Alice running the ASW protocol as initiator with Bob. Even though
not drawn, every vertex in the tree has a self-loop with priority 0.
replacement contract (as defined above). More precisely, W waits to receive the
standard or replacement contract (as defined above) on a network channel from
B and if it receives such a contract, moves to a vertex called, say Bhascontract;
W ignores all other messages it receives.
3.5 The Concurrent Game Structure Induced by a Protocol
We now introduce the concurrent game structure induced by a protocol. The
players involved are the honest principals, the scheduled secure channels, and
the Dolev-Yao intruder (who subsumes the dishonest principals). The concurrent
game structure describes what moves these players can take in every state and
what effect these moves have. Roughly speaking, the possible moves of an honest
principal are those edges (receive-send actions) that leave the current vertex and
that can be applied given the current input and the priority on the edges. As a
result of taking such an edge, the principal writes output on (zero, one, or more)
channels. A scheduled secure channel is represented by a sequence of messages,
the messages on this channel. In a move it decides whether or not to deliver the
first message in this sequence. (Alternatively, in case one would like to model
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rules:
R1 : sch(A, T ) : ma
a ⇒ sch(T,A) : maka
R2 : sch(A, T ) : mr
b ⇒ sch(T,A) : mrcb
R3 : dir(B, T ) : mr
c ⇒ dir(T,B) : mrcc
R4 :
sch(A, T ) : mrd





sch(A, T ) : mae




R6 : dir(B, T ) : mr
a ⇒ dir(T,B) : maka
R7 : dir(B, T ) : mr
b ⇒ dir(T,B) : mrcb
R8 : sch(A, T ) : mr
c ⇒ sch(T,A) : mrcc
R9 : sch(A, T ) : ma











mru = 〈meu1 ,me
u
2〉
meu1 = sig[kA, 〈kA, kB , kT , contract, xu〉]
meu2 = sig[kB , 〈me
u
1 , yu〉]
mau = sig[kA, 〈abort,meu1 〉]
maku = sig[kT , 〈abort,meu1 〉]
mrcu = sig[kT , 〈meu1 ,me
u
2 〉]
a b c d e
f
Fig. 2. This is the tree model of participant TTP. Even though not drawn, every vertex
in the tree has a self-loop with priority 0. The rules R1 to R5 are needed to distinguish
between whether the TTP receives in one step (1) one abort message from A, (2) one
resolve message from A, (3) one resolve message from B, (4) a resolve message from
both A and B, or (5) an abort message from A and a resolve message from B.
secure channels that do not preserve the order of messages, one could allow
secure channels to pick one of the messages in their sequence.) The intruder has
an infinite number of possible moves. He can write a message on all channels that
he controls, where for every such channel he can pick one of the (infinitely many
possible) messages that he can derive in the current state. Direct secure channels
will always immediately deliver the message written to them, and therefore, they
do not need to be modeled as players. Before providing the formal definition of
the concurrent game structure, we need to introduce some notation.
For a principal P and a node v of P , we write P↓v to denote the subtree
of P rooted at v. If σ is a substitution, we write Pσ for the principal obtained
from P by applying σ to every rule occurring in P .
For a protocol Pr, let C = C(P , a) ∩ ch(Pr) and C′ = C(a,P) ∩ ch(Pr).
For m : C → M◦, m′ : C′ → M◦, an a-instance P = (V,E, v0, ℓp, ℓ), and an
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a-instance P ′, we write (m, P )
v
7→ (m′, P ′) if v ∈ V , (v0, v) ∈ E, ℓ(v0, v) is of the
form r⇒ s, and there exists a substitution σ with dom(σ) = V(r) such that
– P ′ = (P ↓ v)σ,
– m matches with r by σ,
– for all v′ ∈ V such that (v0, v′) ∈ E, ℓ(v0, v′) = (r′ ⇒ s′) and m matches
with r′ we have that ℓp(v0, v) ≥ ℓp(v0, v′), and
– m′ matches with s by σ and m′(c) = ◦ for each c ∈ C′ \ ch(s).
In what follows, let Pr = (H,D,K0, {P 0a }a∈H) be a protocol. Let m ∈ M◦ and
t ∈ T◦. Let IC = (Net(P ,H) ∪Dir(D,H) ∪ Sch(D,H)) ∩ ch(Pr) be the set of all
channels in Pr the intruder may write to and let SC = Sch(P ,P) ∩ ch(Pr) be
the set of all scheduled secure channels in Pr.
We are now ready to define the concurrent game structure induced by Pr.
The concurrent game structure S = SPr = 〈Σ,Q,P, π,∆, δ〉 induced by Pr is
defined as follows:
– The set of players Σ is H ∪ SC ∪ {I}.
– The set of states Q consists of tuples of the form (K, P ,m, s) where
• K is a finite set of messages (the current intruder knowledge),
• P is a family {Pa}a∈H of a-instances Pa for every a ∈ H,
• m is a family {ma}a∈H of multi messages ma : C(P , a)∩ ch(Pr) → M◦
for every a ∈ H (the current input to a).5
• s is a family {(sc, dc)}c∈SC of tuples (sc, dc) where sc ∈ M∗ is a sequence
of messages, the messages on c, and dc ∈ {delivered, delivered}, indicating
whether or not c delivered a message in the previous step, for every
c ∈ SC.
– The set P of propositional variables contains a propositional variable pa
for each constant a ∈ A, a propositional variable pv for each vertex v of a
principal specified in Pr (recall that different principals have different sets of
vertices), and propositional variables emptyc and deliveredc for every c ∈ SC.
– The evaluation π of the propositional variables in a state q = (K, P ,m, s) is
defined as follows:
π(q) = {pa | a ∈ d(K) ∩ A} ∪
{pv | v is the root of Pa for some a ∈ H} ∪
{emptyc | c ∈ SC, sc = ε} ∪
{deliveredc | c ∈ SC, dc = delivered},
i.e., pa is true in q if the intruder can derive a from its current knowledge, pv
is true in q if some honest principal is in vertex v, emptyc is true if c currently
does not contain any messages, and deliveredc is true if dc = delivered.
5 Messages which are to be delivered to the intruder or scheduled secure channels will
immediately be added to the intruder’s knowledge and the secure channel buffer,
respectively.
17
– For q = (K, P ,m, s) ∈ Q as above and a player α ∈ Σ, we define ∆(q, α) as
follows:
• If α ∈ H with Pα = (V,E, v0, ℓp, ℓ), the set ∆(q, α) consists of all v ∈ V
such that (mα, Pα)
v
7→ (m, P ′α) for some m and P
′
α, i.e., α can take one
of the edges leaving the current vertex. If this set is empty, we define
∆(q, α) = {v0} (see below for an explanation).
• If α = I, the set ∆(q, α) consists of all m : IC → M◦ such that
m(c) ∈ d(K) for every c ∈ IC, i.e., the intruder can send messages
on the channels that he controls, where the messages are derived from
his current knowledge.
• If α ∈ SC, then ∆(q, α) = {0}, in case sα = ε (i.e., sα is empty), and
∆(q, α) = {0, 1}, otherwise (1 =̂ “α delivers the next message in the
sequence” and 0 =̂ “α does not deliver a message”).
– For q = (K, P ,m, s) ∈ Q and a total move γ ∈ ∆Σq , we define the γ-
successor δ(q, γ) of q to be the state (K′, P
′
,m′, s′) with P
′
= {P ′a}a∈H,
m′ = {m′a}a∈H, and s
′ = {(s′c, d
′
c)}c∈SC where:
• K′ is K with the following messages added: (1) the first message of sc for
every c ∈ Sch(H,D) ∩ ch(Pr) with γ(c) = 1, and (2) the message m(c)
for every c ∈ (Net(a,P)∪Dir(a,D))∩ ch(Pr) and every a ∈ H such that
γ(a) = v and (ma, Pa)
v
7→ (m, P ′a), i.e., the intruder learns all messages
sent by the scheduled secure channels to dishonest principals, by honest
principals on the network (to honest or dishonest principals) or on direct
secure channels to dishonest principals.6
• P ′a is such that (ma, Pa)
v
7→ (m, P ′a) for some m, v = γ(a), for every
a ∈ H, i.e., principal a takes edge v (and performs receive-send actions
according to the rule the edge to v is labeled with).
• m′a(c) for a ∈ H is equal to:
∗ γ(I)(c), if c ∈ (Net(P , a) ∪ Dir(D, a)),
∗ the first message of sc, if c ∈ Sch(P , a) and γ(c) = 1,
∗ ◦, if c ∈ Sch(P , a) and γ(c) = 0,
∗ m(c), if c = dir(b, a) for some b ∈ H such that (mb, Pb)
v′
7→ (m, P ′b)
and γ(b) = v′, i.e., b has written m(c) on the direct secure channel c
from b to a.
• s′c for c = sch(a, b) is defined as follows: Let sc = m1 . . .mn. If a ∈ H,
then letm =m(c) where (ma, Pa)
v
7→ (m, P ′a) for v = γ(a). If a ∈ D, then
let m =m(c) with γ(I) =m. Now, if γ(c) = 0 and m = ◦, then s′c = sc.
If γ(c) = 1 and m = ◦, then s′c = m2 · · ·mn. If γ(c) = 0 and m 6= ◦, then
s′c = m1 · · ·mnm. If γ(c) = 1 and m 6= ◦, then s
′
c = m2 · · ·mnm. (Note
that if γ(c) = 1, then n ≥ 1.)
6 In case secure channels are not supposed to be read protected, one would add all
messages on direct and scheduled secure channels to the current intruder knowledge.
However, here we model secure channels to be read protected, i.e., the intruder only
gets to see the messages on secure channels to dishonest principals.
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• d′c = delivered if γ(c) = 1, and d
′
c = delivered otherwise, for every c =
sch(a, b) ∈ ch(Pr).
We call the state q0 = (K0, {P 0a }a∈H,m
0, s0) the initial state of SPr where
m0 = {m0a}a∈H with m
0
a(c) = ◦ for every c ∈ C(P , a) and s
0 = {(s0c , d
0
c)}c∈SC
with s0c = ε and d
0
c = delivered for every c ∈ SC.
We defined ∆(q, α) for α ∈ H in such a way that it is never empty. More
precisely, if in the current vertex none of the outgoing edges can be taken, α will
stay in the current state. This, in accordance with standard specifications, models
that unexpected messages are ignored and guarantees that honest principals, just
like all other agents in SPr, can always take an action, and hence, computations
of the overall system will never be blocked. Note that one can explicitly add
edges to the specification of an honest principal that lead to error states and are
taken in case of unexpected messages. The concrete examples that we consider
are always complete in the sense that in every vertex there will be an edge
(possibly a self-loop) that the principal can take.
4 Main Results
In this section, we summarize the main results of this paper. First, we define the
general protocol induced AMC-model checking problem and some subcases. We
then state our (un-)decidability and complexity-theoretic results.
Let Pr = (H,D,K0, {P 0a}a∈H) be a protocol and SPr = 〈ΣPr, QPr,PPr, πPr,
∆Pr, δPr〉 the concurrent game structure induced by Pr.
We call
Pamc = {(Pr, ϕ) | Pr a protocol and ϕ an AMC-formula over ΣPr and PPr
such that (SPr, q
0) |= ϕ where q0 is the initial state of SPr}
the (general) protocol induced AMC-model checking problem. The size of an in-
stance (Pr, ϕ) of this problem is defined to be |Pr| + |ϕ|.
As we will see, this problem is undecidable. To identify the main sources
of undecidability and to obtain decidable subcases, we now introduce certain
classes of protocols and define certain fragments of AMC.
We call a protocol Pr dishonest scheduled secure channel free (dssc-free) if
no honest principal uses a scheduled secure channel from a dishonest principal as
input channel, i.e., ch(Pr) ∩ Sch(D,H) = ∅. Otherwise, we call a protocol dssc-
containing. Note that dssc-free protocols allow honest principals to use direct
secure channels from dishonest principals as input channel. Since these channels
are completely controlled by the adversary, they provide the adversary with more
power than scheduled secure channels. Hence, the exclusion of scheduled secure
channels from dishonest principals is not a real restriction in terms of the power
of the adversary.
We also consider what we call greedy protocols, which contains only greedy
honest principals. Intuitively, an honest principal is greedy if it does not ignore
messages in case they conform to the protocol specification. Formally, greedy
protocols are defined as follows.
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An a-rule r⇒ s is consuming if ch(r) 6= ∅. Intuitively, if principal a performs
a consuming rule, then the form of the incoming messages matters.
An a-instance P is greedy if for all vertices v of P the outgoing edges of v
labeled with consuming rules have priorities strictly higher than the priority of
the self-loop of v (if any). Informally speaking, when a greedy principal can read
a term using some consuming rule, then he has to apply such a rule, and hence,
as a result moves to another vertex.
A protocol Pr is greedy if all of its a-instances, for a ∈ H, are. Assuming a
protocol to be greedy is a realistic assumption since in typical protocol specifi-
cations honest principals will not ignore messages if these messages conform to
the messages they expect to receive.
We consider a fragment of AMC, called I-monotone formulas where I denotes
the intruder in the concurrent game structure induced by a protocol. Formally,
an AMC-formula ϕ is I-positive if all subformulas of ϕ of the form 〈〈A〉〉ψ with
I ∈ A fall under an even number of negations and all subformulas of ϕ of the
form 〈〈A〉〉ψ with I /∈ A fall under an odd number of negations. An AMC-formula
ϕ is I-negative if ¬ϕ is I-positive. A formula ϕ is I-monotone if it is either I-
positive or I-negative.
As we mentioned above, each AMC-formula can be written in negation nor-
mal form using the abbreviation introduced in Section 2.2. It is easy to see that
if ϕ is an I-positive AMC-formula and ϕ′ is the corresponding AMC-formula in
negation normal form, then (i) for each subformula of ϕ′ of the form 〈〈A〉〉 dψ′
we have that I ∈ A and (ii) for each subformula of ϕ′ of the form JAK dψ′ we
have that I /∈ A.
I-positive, -negative, and -monotone ATL- and ATL∗-formulas are defined
in the same way. As shown by Alur et al. [2] (see also Theorem 1), every ATL
and ATL∗-formula can be translated into an equivalent AMC-formula. It is not
hard to see that the translation preserves the property of being I-positive/-
negative, i.e., the translation of an I-positive/-negative ATL∗-formula yields an
I-positive/-negative AMC formula.
While the class of I-monotone AMC-formulas is a proper fragment of the set
of all AMC-formulas in terms of expressibility, all formulas (typically ATL or
fair ATL) that we encountered in the literature for specifying security properties
of cryptographic protocol are I-monotone. Hence, the restriction to I-monotone
formulas does not seem to be a restriction from a practical point of view (see
Section 5 for more details).
In what follows, we denote by
Pamc(greedy/non-greedy,dssc-containing/-free,I-positive/-negative/-monotone)
the protocol induced AMC-model checking problem where the class of protocols
is restricted to those that are i) greedy/non-greedy and ii) dssc-containing/-free
and the AMC-formulas considered are I-positive/-negative/-monotone, respec-
tively.
Now, we can state our main results. The first theorem shows that Pamc is
undecidability in case of non-greedy protocols.
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Theorem 2. Pamc(non-greedy,dssc-free,I-positive) is undecidable, and hence,
so is Pamc(non-greedy,dssc-free,I-negative) and Pamc(non-greedy,dssc-free,I-
monotone).
The proof of this theorem is presented in Section 6. It shows that the problem
is undecidable even if no scheduled secure channels are used at all, i.e., neither
from dishonest nor from honest principals, and if a very simple fixed I-positive
formula is used, namely, 〈〈I〉〉3pok where pok is a propositional variable.
The above theorem shows that to obtain decidability, one at least has to
consider greedy protocols. The following theorem exhibits another source of un-
decidability, namely scheduled secure channels from dishonest parties.
Theorem 3. Pamc(greedy, dssc-containing, I-positive) is undecidable, and
hence, so is Pamc(greedy, dssc-containing, I-negative) and Pamc(greedy, dssc-
containing, I-monotone).
The proof is presented in Section 7. Again, a fixed formula suffices for the proof,
namely 〈〈I, sch(pcp, test)〉〉3pok.
The two theorems above show that to obtain decidability, one has to restrict
protocols to be greedy and dssc-free. The following theorem states that for this
class of protocol and I-monotone formulas we obtain decidability of the AMC-
model checking problem.
Theorem 4. The problem Pamc(greedy, dssc-free, I-monotone) is decidable.
More precisely, the problem Pamc(greedy, dssc-free, I-positive) is NEXPTIME-
complete, and hence, Pamc(greedy, dssc-free, I-negative) is coNEXPTIME-com-
plete.
The only gap that the above theorem leaves is whether Pamc is also decidable for
non I-monotone formulas. As explained before, from a practical point of view the
theorem seems to suffice since the formulas that we encountered in the literature
fall into the class of I-monotone formulas. While, as the undecidability results
show, the restrictions to greedy and dssc-free protocol cannot be avoided, these
restrictions are also not severe since typically protocols are greedy and requiring
protocols to be dssc-free does not restrict the power of the adversary.
5 Example Properties
In this section, we illustrate the kind of properties that can be expressed in
the I-monotone fragment of AMC. Kremer and Raskin [16, 17] were the first to
formulate properties of fair exchange protocols, including contract-signing and
non-repudiation protocols, in terms of fair ATL, a fragment of ATL∗ [2], and
hence, of AMC [2] (see also Theorem 1). It turns out that all properties that
Kremer and Raskin have formulated fall into the I-monotone fragment of AMC,
suggesting that the I-montone fragment of AMC suffices for most properties of
interest. We demonstrate this fact by recalling some of these properties. Since,
as mentioned, AMC is more expressive than ATL∗, in what follows, for conve-
nience we use ATL∗ as the specification language. As we will see, we will only
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need I-monotone ATL∗ formulas. As mentioned in Section 4, I-monotonicity is
preserved under the translation to AMC as proposed in [2], i.e., AMC formulas
corresponding to I-monotone ATL∗ formulas are I-monotone.
The precise formulations of the properties stated by Kremer and Raskin
typically depend on the specific protocol analyzed. For concreteness, we will
therefore consider the specification of the ASW protocol PrASW , with honest A
and T and dishonest B, as presented in Section 3.4. Hence, formulas are stated
w.r.t. the concurrent game structure SPrASW induced by PrASW .
As for example in [2], we use 3ϕ (read “eventually ϕ”) as abbreviation for the
LTL-formula (true U ϕ) and 2ϕ (read “always ϕ”) as abbreviation for ¬3¬ϕ.
Fairness. According to Kremer and Raskin, a protocol is unfair for honest A if
dishonest B together with all scheduled secure channels has a strategy to obtain
a signed contract from A such that A does not have a strategy to receive a signed
contract from B, given that the secure scheduled channels between A and T are
fair, i.e., messages on these channels are eventually delivered.
For the ASW protocol as specified in Section 3.4 this property can be formal-
ized by the following I-positive ATL∗ formula where SC = sch({A,B, T}, {A,
B, T}) ∩ ch(PrASW ) is the set of all scheduled secure channels used in PrASW :





23¬emptyc → 23deliveredc (2)
says that the scheduled secure channels between A and T are fair7 and
ϕAhascontract = pcontract ∨ presolved1 ∨ presolved2 (3)
says that A has a standard or replacement contract, according to the protocol
specification.
The property formulated in (1) requires A to use the protocol in a “smart”
way in order to get a signature from B. An alternative, stronger formulation of
fairness would require that if A finished the protocol, and hence, if A cannot
take any further action, either both A and B or neither of the two parties has
a signed contract, provided that the scheduled secure channels between A and
T are fair. In other words, the protocol is unfair, if there exists a state in the
protocol run where i) A cannot take any further action, ii) A does not have a
signature from B, but iii) B has a signature from A. Formally:
〈〈I, A, T,SC〉〉(ϕFairSch ∧ 3(ϕAfinished ∧ ¬ϕAhascontract ∧ pBhascontract)) (4)
7 Alternatively, one could require the other scheduled secure channels to be fair as well.
The formulation of fairness for channels as presented is standard and, for example,
also appears in [2].
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where
ϕAfinished = pcontract ∨ presolved1 ∨ presolved2 ∨ paborted (5)
says that A finished her protocol run.
Timeliness. According to Kremer and Raskin, a protocol is timely for honest A
if A has a strategy to finish the protocol while preserving fairness. Again, the
scheduled secure channels (at least those between A and T ) are required to be
fair. Formally, timeliness for A is expressed by the following I-negative ATL∗
formula:
〈〈A〉〉(ϕFairSch → 3(ϕAfinished∧
(¬ϕAhascontract → ¬〈〈I,SC〉〉(ϕFairSch ∧ 3pBhascontract)))). (6)
Balance and Abuse-freeness. According to Kremer and Raskin, a protocol is
unbalanced for honest A if at some stage of the protocol run dishonest B has
both a strategy to obtain a signature from A and a strategy to prevent A from
obtaining a signature from B. For the protocol to be abusive, one additionally
requires that B can convince an outside party C of this property. Whether
or not B has this ability is indicated, in the model of Kremer and Raskin,
by a propositional variable pprove2C, which can as well be expressed in terms of
propositional variables on vertices. Again, the scheduled secure channels between
A and T are required to be fair. Unbalanced for A can be formulated as an I-
positive ATL∗ formula as follows:
〈〈I,SC, A, T 〉〉ϕFairSch ∧ 3(ϕgetcontract ∧ ϕprevent) (7)
where
ϕgetcontract = 〈〈I,SC
′′〉〉ϕFairSch → 3pBhascontract, (8)
ϕprevent = 〈〈I,SC
′′〉〉ϕFairSch → 3(¬〈〈A〉〉(ϕFairSch → 3ϕAhascontract)) (9)
with SC′′ = sch({B, T}, {B, T})∩ ch(PrASW ).
Given pprove2C, according to Kremer and Raskin abusiveness for A is formal-
ized by the following ATL∗ formula:
〈〈I,SC, A, T 〉〉ϕFairSch ∧ 3(pprove2C ∧ ϕgetcontract ∧ ϕprevent) (10)
We note that the more general, protocol-independent formulation of abuse-
freeness proposed in [15] is not captured by the formulation of Kremer and
Raskin. The formulation in [15] defines abuse-freeness in terms of certain tests.
In order to formulate this property in ATL∗ or AMC, one would need to augment
these logics by certain predicates reflecing the tests.
Very similar formulas as the ones presented above have been stated by Kre-
mer and Raskin for non-repudiation protocols [17]. They are I-monotone as
well.
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6 Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 by a reduction from Post’s Corresponding Problem (PCP).
Let us first recall the definition of PCP.
Given an alphabet A with |A| ≥ 2, an instanceΠ of PCP over A is a sequence
(ui, vi)
n
i=1 = (u1, v1), . . . , (un, vn) of pairs (ui, vi) of words ui, vi ∈ A
∗. A solution
of such an instance is a non-empty sequence (ki)
l
i=1 = k1, . . . , kl of indices ki ∈
{1, . . . , n}, i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, for some l such that uk1 · · ·ukl = vk1 · · · vkl . Now,
given an instance of PCP (over A) the question is whether it has a solution. It
is well-known that this problem is undecidable.
We now prove Theorem 2 by reduction from PCP. Let Π be an instance of
PCP over A as above. We (effectively) associate a protocol PrΠ and a formula
ϕΠ to Π such that Π has a solution iff (SPrΠ , q
0) |= ϕΠ where q0 is the initial
state of SPrΠ .
The set of atoms of PrΠ is AΠ = A∪ {⊥, 1, . . . , n}. For a word u ∈ A∗Π and
a term t, we define t · u by induction on the length of u: t · u = t for u = ε and
t · u = 〈t, a〉 · v for u = av and a ∈ AΠ .
We encode a solution ofΠ as a sequence of terms overAΠ = A∪{⊥, 1, . . . , n}
as follows: A sequence t0, . . . , tl of terms over AΠ is called a solution sequence
for Π if the following three conditions are satisfied:
i) t0 = 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉,
ii) tl = 〈m1,m2,m2〉 for terms m1 and m2 over AΠ , and
iii) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , l− 1}, if ti = 〈s, s′, s′′〉, then ti+1 = 〈s · j, s′ · uj, s′′ · vj〉 for
some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
It is easy to see that Π has a solution iff there exists a solution sequence for
Π . For a solution (ki)
l
i=1 of Π we call the solution sequence t0, . . . , tl with
t0 = 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉 and ti+1 = 〈s1 · ki+1, s2 · uki+1 , s3 · vki+1〉 for 0 ≤ i < l and
ti = 〈s1, s2, s3〉 the solution sequence associated with (ki)li=1.
We define ϕΠ = 〈〈I〉〉3pok, i.e., this formula is true in those states where
I has a strategy to obtain ok. (Note that ϕΠ is presented as an ATL-formula,
which by Theorem 1 can be turned into an AMC-formula).
The protocol PrΠ is defined as follows: There is one honest principal, called
test, and one dishonest principal, called pcp, in PrΠ . The initial knowledge of
the intruder is defined to be KΠ = AΠ . The honest principal test is specified by
the test-instance Ptest depicted in Figure 3 and explained next. Altogether, we
define PrΠ = ({test}, {pcp},KΠ , {Ptest}).
Principal test does not use any direct or scheduled secure channels. Hence,
the only channel from which principal test reads is net(pcp, test) and the only
channel to which test writes is net(test, pcp). Hence, the left-hand side of the
test-rules depicted in Figure 3 are the messages test reads from net(pcp, test)
and the messages on the right-hand side of these rules are the messages test
writes to net(test, pcp). The labels [0] and [1] present the priorities of the edges.
Vertices with boxes have self-loops with priority 0, those without do not have
self-loops. Note that Ptest is non-greedy; the greediness condition is violated in
vertex test-seq.
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The purpose of principal test is to test whether the intruder is able to send a
solution sequence. More precisely, test guarantees that the intruder has a strategy
to obtain ok iff the intruder is able to send a solution sequence to test, where
the intruder is supposed to send in every step of a computation in SPrΠ one
element of such a sequence. In initial, once 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉 is received, test can decide
to go to test-initial or test-seq. The purpose of going to test-initial is to check
whether the successor term of 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉 is in fact a successor term according
to the definition of a solution sequence. (The out-going edge from test-initial
with priority 0 guarantees that the intruder has to send a new term after the
initial term 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉.) The purpose of going to test-seq is to either stay there
until a term of the form 〈x, y, y〉 is received, and hence, a valid last term of the
sequence, or to check at some point of the sequence whether two consecutive
terms are connected according to the definition of solution sequences (which can
be done by moving to test-pair).
Before we prove the correctness of our construction, we introduce some no-
tation. By definition, see Section 3.5, a state of the concurrent game structure
SPrΠ specified by the protocol PrΠ is a tuple p = (K, {P}, {m}, s̄) where K
is the intruder knowledge, P is a test-instance, m is a mapping that assigns
messages to the channels read by test, and s̄ is a family of message sequences
representing the states of the scheduled secure channels. Because there are no
secure channels used in this protocol we will omit the last component of states
when referring to them. The only channel from which participant test reads mes-
sages is net(pcp, test). Thus,m assigns messages to net(pcp, test) and we will only
write the messagem(net(pcp, test)) when specifying a state. For ease of notation,
we specify a test-instance in a state simply by its current root node. Thus, by
these conventions the initial state of the concurrent game structure SPrΠ is given
by qinit = (KΠ , initial, ◦). For a state p = (K, s,m) we denote the components
K, s, and m by K(p), statetest(p), and net(pcp, test)(p), respectively. We call m
the value of channel net(pcp, test) in state p.
We now show that Π has a solution iff (SPrΠ , q
0) |= ϕΠ :
⇒: First, we show that if Π has a solution, then the intruder has a strategy to
obtain ok. Intuitively, the strategy of the intruder is to send a solution sequence
to instance test. More specifically, let (ki)
l
i=1 be a solution of Π and let t0, . . . , tl
be the solution sequence associated with (ki)
l
i=1. We may assume, w.l.o.g., that
tl is the first among the terms in the sequence of the form 〈m1,m2,m2〉 for some
m1 and m2.
The (positional) strategy σok of the intruder to obtain ok only depends on
the message on channel net(pcp, test). We define σok by the following table: (Note
that the choice of the intruder is which message he sends to instance test, i.e.,
what the value of net
pcp






























〈x, y, y〉 ⇒ ok
[0]
∅ ⇒ ∅















Fig. 3. Honest instance Ptest in the proof of Theorem 2. A box around a node is an
abbreviation for a self loop with priority 0.
We have to show that if the intruder follows this strategy, then every computation
in SPrΠ starting from the initial state will reach a state q such that ok ∈ K(q). Let
ρ = q0q1 . . . be a computation consistent with σok and such that q0 = q
0. Accord-
ing to the specification of instance test, see Figure 3, we know that statetest(q2) ∈
{test-initial, test-seq}. If statetest(q2) = test-initial, then ok ∈ K(q3) since we have
that net(pcp, test)(q2) = t1. Thus, in this case we are done. If statetest(q2) =
test-seq, then there is a minimal i > 2 such that statetest(qi) 6= test-seq (note
that if statetest(qj) = test-seq and net(pcp, test)(qj) = tn, then according to the
specification of instance test, ok ∈ K(qj+1) and statetest(qj+1) = solution). If
statetest(qi) = solution, then we are obviously done. If statetest(qi) = test-pair,
then we know that net(pcp, test)(qi−1) 6= tn (note that if the intruder has al-
ready sent tn in qi−1 then statetest(qi) would be solution). By the specification
of instance test and by the definition of σok we know that statetest(qi+1) ∈
{p1, . . . , pn} and thus, we are done.
⇐: Now, we prove the other direction, i.e., if the intruder has a strategy to
obtain ok, then Π has a solution. It suffices to show that there is a solution
sequence for instance Π . Let σok be a strategy of the intruder such that in each
computation of SPrΠ starting from the initial state and consistent with σok the
intruder obtains ok. We want to show that the intruder has to send a solution
sequence t0, t1, . . . , tl for Π to instance test. More specifically, we want to show
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that there is a computation ρ = q0q1 . . . of SPrΠ , q0 = q
0, and an index i such
that σok(q0), σok(q0q1), . . . , σok(q0 · · · qi) is a solution sequence for Π .
It is easy to see that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that (*) σok(q
0) = 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉.
The successor state q1 of q
0 is (KΠ , initial, 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉). Since one possible choice
of instance test in state q1 is to proceed to state test-initial one possible successor
state of q1 is (KΠ , test-initial, ◦), see Figure 3. Thus, if σok(q1) 6= 〈⊥·j,⊥·uj,⊥·vj〉
for all j = 1, . . . , n, then instance test will proceed to state fail and the intruder
will not obtain ok. Since σok is a strategy for the intruder to obtain ok we
can conclude that (**) σok(q1) is of the form 〈⊥ · j,⊥ · uj ,⊥ · vj〉 for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If the choice of instance test in state q1 is to proceed to state test-seq, then
the successor state of q1 is (KΠ , test-seq, σok(q1)). By an inductive argument it
is easy to see that for a run ρ = q0, q1, q2, . . . of SPrΠ that is consistent with σok
we have that: (***) if statetest(qi) = test-seq, net(pcp, test)(qi) = 〈m1,m2,m3〉,
where m2 6= m3, then σok(qi) = 〈m1 · j,m2 · uj,m3 · vj〉 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since σok is a strategy for the intruder to obtain ok there is no computation
ρ = q0, q1, . . . of SPrΠ that is consistent with σok such that statetest(qj) =
test-seq from some point on, i.e., statetest(qj) = test-seq for all j > i for some
i > 0. Since instance test can decide to stay in state test-seq if net(pcp, test) is
not of the form 〈m1,m2,m2〉 for some terms m1 and m2 we can conclude that
there is a computation ρ′ = q′0, q
′
1, . . . that is consistent with σok such that there
is some minimal i such that statetest(q
′
i) = solution. Thus, net(pcp, test)(q
′
i−1) =
〈m1,m2,m2〉 for some terms m1,m2. Together with (*), (**), and (***) we can






1), . . . , σok(q
′
0 · · · q
′
i−2) is a solution
sequence for Π . 2
7 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 is very similar to the one of Theorem 2.
In Section 6, we used the non-greediness of instance Ptest in node test-seq
to check property iii) of solution sequences: From node test-seq of instance Ptest
there is a self-loop with priority 0 and a consuming edge with priority 0 (see Fig-
ure 3). Applying the self-loop means “do not check” and applying the outgoing
edge means “check” whether the next two messages fulfill property iii) of solu-
tion sequences. In other words, in node test-seq, Ptest can non-deterministically
decide when to check property iii) of solution sequences for two consecutive mes-
sages. However, now we are not allowed to use non-greediness anymore. Never-
theless, we can simulate this non-deterministic behavior by introducing a new
instance, which we will call Pcheck. Basically, this instance will send a “check”
message to Ptest in order to tell Ptest when to check. More precisely, in the
very first step of the protocol run Pcheck will send the “check” message on a
scheduled secure channel sch(check, test) to Ptest. Then, this scheduled secure
channel will non-deterministically decide when it delivers the “check” message.
(Alternatively, Pcheck could be defined to be non-deterministic and decide when






































〈x, y, y〉 ⇒ ok
solution
[2]




(check, 〈x, y, z〉) ⇒ ∅
[2]
[1]
Fig. 4. Honest instance Ptest in the proof of Theorem 3. A box around a node is an
abbreviation for a self-loop with priority 0.
this instance seems to be less natural than the first one.) The only problem
is that if in one step of the protocol run the sch(check, test) decides to deliver
the “check” message, then in the next state the intruder knows that a check
will be performed in the next step. Hence, he could produce a message that
together with the previous message sent passes the test, even though the rest
of the sequence that the intruder is sending does not satisfy the conditions on
solution sequences. In other words, the intruder knows one step in advance, i.e.,
before sending the second message of the two messages to be checked, when a
check is going to be performed. (Note that in the proof of Theorem 2 this was
not the case since by the time Ptest changed its internal state to perform the
check, the intruder must have sent the second message already.) We therefore
let the intruder communicate with Ptest only over a scheduled secure channel
sch(pcp, test). Now, by the time the intruder gets to know that a check is going to
be performed, he must already have sent the second message of the two messages
to be checked to sch(pcp, test). In other words, he must already have committed
to the second message, and hence, cannot change it anymore. Thus, this second
message must have been valid in the first place.
We now present the reduction formally and prove its correctness. Let Π =
(ui, vi)
n
i=1 be an instance of PCP over the alphabet A. As in Section 6, we
define a protocol PrΠ and an ATL-formula ϕΠ such that Π has a solution iff
(SPrΠ , q
0) |= ϕΠ where q0 is the initial state of SPrΠ .
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Protocol PrΠ contains two honest principals, Ptest and Pcheck and one dis-
honest principal pcp. The initial knowledge of the intruder is defined by KΠ = A.
Altogether, PΠ = ({test, Pcheck}, {pcp},KΠ , {Ptest, PPcheck
}) where the test-
instance Ptest is specified by the tree given in Figure 4, explained below. The
instance Pcheck consists of only two edges: one edge (from the root to another
node, say v) is labeled with a check-rule of the form ∅ ⇒ check where check
is sent via sch(check, test) to Ptest. The second edge is a self-loop at v. Hence,
the only action that Pcheck takes is to send, in the first protocol step, check to
sch(check, test).
The definition of Ptest (see Figure 4) is similar to the one of Ptest in the proof
of Theorem 2. However, now Ptest may receive messages from two scheduled se-
cure channels, sch(check, test) and sch(pcp, test). The convention in Figure 4 is
that if the left-hand side of the rule consists only of one message, then this
message comes from sch(pcp, test). If the left-hand side is a tuple with two com-
ponents (this is only the case for the rule the edge from test-seq to test-pair is la-
beled with), then the first component is the message coming from sch(check, test)
and the other one from sch(pcp, test).
The intuition behind Ptest as presented in Figure 4 is the same as the one in
Figure 3. The edge from test-seq to e is needed to guarantee that sch(pcp, test)
always delivers messages. The priority of the edge from test-seq to test-pair is now
1, instead of 0, and hence, test-seq satisfies the greediness condition. However,
because of the message check coming from sch(check, test), this edge will only be
applied if sch(check, test) has delivered check.
The formula ϕΠ is defined as ϕΠ = 〈〈I, sch(pcp, test)〉〉Fpok. (Note that, as
in Section 6, we define, w.l.o.g., ϕΠ as an ATL-formula.)
We now prove that our construction is correct, i.e., we prove that Π has a
solution iff (SPrΠ , q
0) |= ϕΠ :
⇒: First we show that if Π has a solution, then I together with the scheduled
secure channel sch(pcp, test) has a strategy such that I obtains ok. Similar to the
proof of Theorem 2, the strategy of I is to send a solution sequence to test via
sch(pcp, test) and the strategy of sch(pcp, test) is to deliver a message whenever
possible. More precisely, let (ki)
l
i=1 be a solution of Π and let t0, . . . , tl be the
solution sequence associated with (ki)
l
i=1 (as defined in Section 6).
It is easy to see that if I and sch(pcp, test) follow their strategy, then after
two steps participant test is in state start and message 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉 is on chan-
nel sch(pcp, test) ready to be read by test. Also, Pcheck has written check on
sch(check, test), which in turn may or may not have delivered this message.
At this point, participant test has two alternatives to proceed: 1) advance to
test-initial or 2) advance to test-seq (see Figure 4). If test advances to test-initial,
then in the next step test advances to one of the states t1, . . . , tn and the in-
truder will obtain ok. If test advances to test-seq, we have to distinguish between
two cases: 2a) message check is not delivered to test by sch(check, test) before
the last message of the solution sequence sent by the intruder is delivered to
test by sch(pcp, test) and 2b) message check is delivered to test before the last
message of the solution sequence sent by the intruder is delivered to test. In
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case 2a) participant test advances to solution and the intruder will obtain ok.
In case 2b) participant test advances to test-pair and since the intruder has sent
a solution sequence to test and sch(pcp, test) immediately delivers all messages,
test advances to one of the states p1, . . . , pn and the intruder obtains ok.
⇐: Now, we have to show that if the intruder together with the scheduled secure
channel sch(pcp, test) has a strategy σok such that the intruder obtains ok, then
the PCP-instance Π has a solution. It is easy to see when playing according to
strategy σok that the intruder at some point must send 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉 to test over
the scheduled secure channel sch(pcp, test) and that at some point sch(pcp, test)
delivers this message. Thus, at some point participant test is in state start and
〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉 is ready to be read on channel sch(pcp, test). There are two possible
ways of how participant test may proceed: 1) advancing to state test-initial and
2) advancing to state test-seq. If 1) participant test advances to test-initial, then
we have that (*) there has to be a message of the form 〈⊥ · i,⊥ · ui,⊥ · vi〉
stored on channel sch(pcp, test) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} since otherwise in the
next step test would advance to state fail and the intruder would not obtain
ok, in contradiction to the assumption. If 2) participant test advances to state
test-seq, then because of the edge from test-seq to e, we know that in each step
sch(pcp, test) has to deliver a message to test, since otherwise participant test
would advance to e and the intruder could not obtain ok anymore. We now
distinguish between two cases: 2a) message check is never delivered to test by
the scheduled secure channel sch(check, test) and 2b) message check is delivered
to test eventually. In case of 2a), we have that (**) at some point sch(pcp, test)
must deliver a message of the form 〈m1,m2,m2〉 to test since this is the only way
for the intruder to obtain ok. In case of 2b), similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we
can conclude that (***) the sequence of messages delivered by sch(pcp, test) to
test satisfy property iii) of the properties of solution sequences. At this point we
use that the intruder sends messages to test via a scheduled secure channel. This
guarantees that the intruder must have sent the next message in a sequence to
sch(pcp, test) before he knows that a check is going to be performed. Now, from
(*), (**), and (***) we can conclude that the intruder has to send a solution
sequence to test, and thus, Π has a solution.
8 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove Theorem 4, it obviously suffices to show that Pamc(greedy, dssc-
containing, I-positive) is NEXPTIME-complete. In the following subsections,
this statement is proved. The proof of the complexity upper bound is presented
in Section 8.1, with the proofs of key lemmas postponed to Section 8.2 to 8.6.
The complexity lower bound is shown in Section 8.7.
8.1 Poof of Theorem 4 Using Key Lemmas
In this section, we prove Theorem 4 using three key lemmas. The proofs of these
lemmas are postponed to subsequent sections.
30
Let Pr = (H,D,K, {Pa}a∈H) be a greedy and dssc-free protocol and ϕ be
an I-positive AMC-formula over ΣPr and PPr. Since every AMC-formula can
(in polynomial-time) be turned into an AMC-formula in negation normal form,
we may, w.l.o.g., assume that ϕ is in negation normal form. Let S = SPr =
〈Σ,QS,P, π,∆, δ〉 be the concurrent game structure induced by Pr.
We define an equivalence relation ∼ on QS as follows. For q, q′ ∈ QS , we
write q ∼ q′ if q and q′ are equal up to the messages on input ports of honest
participants, i.e., Kq = Kq′ , P q = P q′ , and sq = sq′ . We will write q ≺ q′, if
q 6∼ q′ and q′ is a descendant of q in S, i.e., there exists q1, . . . , qn such that
q1 = q, qn = q
′, and qi+1 is a successor of qi for every i = 1, . . . , n−1. We extend
these relations to states of the parity game Gϕ(S,q0) where q
0 is the initial state
of S: We write (q, ψ) ∼ (q′, ψ′), if q ∼ q′, and we write (q, ψ) ≺ (q′, ψ′), if q ≺ q′.
We call a state q of S consuming, if on the input port of some honest partic-
ipant a there is a message which can be read by some consuming rule. Since, by
assumption a is greedy, this implies that a’s state will change in the next step,
i.e., a moves to a new vertex. Formally, a state q = (K, P ,m, s) is consuming,
if there exists a ∈ H with Pa = (V,E, v0, ℓp, ℓ) and if there exists v ∈ V such
that ℓ(v0, v) = (r ⇒ s) is consuming and ma matches with r. Otherwise, q is
called non-consuming. Note that in non-consuming states, honest principals can
only take edges with non-consuming rules (including self-loops). In particular,
any two equivalent, non-consuming states have the same set of successors. We
call a vertex v = (q, ψ) in Gϕ(S,q0) non-consuming if q is non-consuming.
The following definition says that a strategy is ∼-uniform if the intruder
chooses the same messages whenever he is in certain non-consuming, equivalent
states.
Definition 1. Consider the game Gϕ(S,q0) as above. A strategy f for Player 0 is
∼-uniform, if it is memoryless and moreover, for all non-consuming states v, v′
with v ∼ v′ we have that:
(a) If v = (q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ), v′ = (q′, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ) with f(v) = (q,2cψ) and f(v′) =
(q′,2c′ψ), then c = c
′.
(b) If v = (q,3cψ) and v
′ = (q′,3cψ) then f(v) = f(v
′).
The following lemma says that it suffices to consider ∼-uniform strategies.
Lemma 1. If there exists a winning strategy of Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0), then there
exists a ∼-uniform winning strategy for this player.
The proof of this lemma is provided in Section 8.4. We call a strategy graph
induced by a ∼-uniform strategy a ∼-uniform strategy graph.
Lemma 2. If F is a ∼-uniform strategy graph for Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0), then the
length of every path in F starting from the initial vertex and without repetitions
has length polynomially bounded in |Pr| + |ϕ|. Also, the number of reachable
vertices of F is exponentially bounded in |Pr| + |ϕ|.
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The proof of this lemma is provided in the Section 8.5. Lemma 1 and 2 imply that
if Player 0 wins the game Gϕ(S,q0), then one can witness this fact by a strategy
graph F with an exponentially bounded number of vertices. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the representation of F is bounded exponentially in
|Pr|+ |ϕ| since the size of states in F , in particular the size of messages in such
states, might be big. Fortunately, it is possible to show that the overall size of
F can be bounded exponentially, where the size of a strategy graph is defined
in the obvious way according to some standard representation, where the set of
all messages occurring in F are represented by a single DAG.
Lemma 3. If F is a winning strategy graph for Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0) as described
in Lemma 2, then there exists a winning strategy graph F ′ of (overall) size ex-
ponentially bounded in |Pr| + |ϕ|.
The proof of this lemma is provided in Section 8.6.
Using the three lemmas just stated, it immediately follows that Pamc(greedy,
dssc-containing, I-positive) is in NEXPTIME: By the lemmas, we know that
Player 0 wins Gϕ(S,q0) iff there exists a winning strategy graph for Player 0 of
size exponentially bounded in |Pr| + |ϕ|. So, we first guess such a graph and
then check whether it represents a winning strategy graph for Player 0. The last
step can be checked in polynomial time in the size of the graph (see, e.g., [11]).
Hence, we have a non-deterministic exponential-time algorithm for the problem
Pamc(greedy, dssc-containing, I-positive).
In the following sections, we present the proofs of Lemma 1 to 3. However,
first, in Section 8.2 and 8.3 we summarize some useful properties of concurrent
game structures and parity games induced by protocols.
8.2 Properties of Concurrent Game Structures for Protocols
The following lemma says that ≺ as defined above is transitive, where for an
instance P we write root(P ) to denote the root of P .
Lemma 4. Let S be defined as above and let q, q′, q′′ be states of S. If q ≺ q′
and q′ ≺ q′′, then q ≺ q′′.
Proof. Let q = (K, P ,m, s), q′ = (K′, P
′
,m′, s′), q′′ = (K′′, P
′′
,m′′, s′′) be states
of S = 〈Σ,Q,P, π,∆, δ〉 such that q ≺ q′ and q′ ≺ q′′. We have to show that
q ≺ q′′, i.e., q 6∼ q′′ and q′′ is a descendant of q. Obviously, q′′ is a descendant of
q. Since q 6∼ q′ and q′ 6∼ q′′, one of the following cases must occur. From every
case we can conclude that q 6∼ q′′:




a for some a ∈ H: By definition of S and since q
′ is a
descendant of q and q′′ is a descendant of q′, it follows that root(P ′′a ) is a
(proper) descendant of root(Pa) in Pa. In particular, root(Pa) 6= root(P ′′a ).
Hence, q 6∼ q′′.
– K 6= K′ or K′ 6= K′′: Since q′ is a descendant of q and q′′ is a descendant
of q′ we know that K ⊆ K′ ⊆ K′′. Thus, we can conclude that K is a strict
subset of K′′. Thus, q 6∼ q′′.
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c ) for some c ∈ Sch(H,P)∩ch(Pr) (note
that ch(Pr)∩Sch(D,P) = ∅ since protocols are dssc-free) and Pa = P ′a = P
′′
a
for all a ∈ H: Since c = sch(a, b) for some honest a ∈ H and some b ∈ P ,




a for all a ∈ H, we know that nothing is written to any
scheduled secure channel by a, and hence, |sc| ≥ |s′c| ≥ |s
′′
c |. If |sc| > |s
′′
c |,
we immediately obtain that q 6∼ q′′. Otherwise, we have |sc = s′′c | which
implies that d′c = d
′′
c = delivered and thus dc = delivered. So, dc 6= d
′′
c . Thus,
q 6∼ q′′. ⊓⊔
While a computation in the concurrent game structure for a protocol can be
infinite, “real progress”, which is captured by relation ≺, can only be made a
bounded number of times during such a computation. This fact is formally stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If q1 ≺ · · · ≺ qn, then n is bounded polynomially w.r.t. the size of
Pr.
Proof. If q ≺ q′, then, by definition, one of the following cases holds: q and q′
differ on the state of (a) some honest participant, (b) a scheduled secure channel
in Sch(H,P), or (c) the intruder knowledge.
The lemma follows from the following observations: Each honest participant
can change his state at most n times, where n is the size of the protocol de-
scription, so case (a) can happen only n2 times. Moreover, each scheduled secure
channel in Sch(H,P) receives only n messages (from honest participants) during
the course of a protocol execution, so its state can be changed at most 2n times.
It means that case (b) can happen at most 2n2 times. Now, whenever a state
of the intruder is changed, the state of some honest participant or some secure
channel has to be changed as well. So, if (c) happens, then so must (a) or (b). ⊓⊔
The following lemma follows immediately from the definition of a consuming
state and greedy principals (recall that principals considered here are greedy).
Lemma 6. If a state q is consuming and q′ is a successor of q, then q′ ≺ q.
The next lemma formalizes the already mentioned intuition behind non-
consuming states (see Section 8.1): When in a non-consuming state, an instance
ignores incoming messages, and hence, two equivalent, non-consuming states
have the same set of successors.
Lemma 7. Let q1, q2 be non-consuming states with q1 ∼ q2. If a state q is a
c-successor of q1, for c ∈ ∆A(q1) and some A ⊆ Σ, then c ∈ ∆A(q2) and q is
also a c-successor of q2.
Proof. Since q1 ∼ q2, we have q1 = (K, P ,m1, s) and q2 = (K, P ,m2, s). It is
enough to show that if c ∈ ∆Σ(q1), then c ∈ ∆Σ(q2) and δ(q1, c) = δ(q2, c).
The set of moves of I depends only on the intruder knowledge (K) which
is the same in q1 and q2 and the result of applying these moves has the same
consequences.
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The set of moves of the secure channels depends only on s which, again, is
the same in q1 and q2. Thus, these players have the same moves in q1 and q2,
and the result of applying these moves has again the same consequences.
The states of an honest participant in q1 and q2 are the same, and, because
the states are non-consuming, only non-consuming rules (and exactly those) can
be applied. But the set of these rules is the same in q1 and q2 and the application
of these rules does not depend on the current input. Hence, the result of applying
these moves has the same consequences. ⊓⊔
8.3 Some Properties of Parity Games for Protocols
Given Pr, S = SPr, q
0 (the initial state of S), and an I-positive AMC-formula
ϕ in negation normal form as above, in this section we study the induced parity
game Gϕ(S,q0). We also state some general properties of parity games. We first
note:
Remark 1. For each subformula 〈〈A〉〉 dψ of ϕ, we have that I ∈ A and for each
subformula JAK dψ of ϕ, we have that I /∈ A. Also, for each subformula 2cψ of
ϕ, the domain of c contains I and for each subformula 3cψ of ϕ, the domain of
c does not contain I.
The following lemma is a consequence of Lemma 7.
Lemma 8. If (q1,3cψ) and (q2,3cψ) are vertices of G
ϕ
(S,q0) where q1 and q2 are
non-consuming, q1 ∼ q2, and such that (q, ψ) is a successor of (q1,3cψ), then
(q, ψ) is also a successor of (q2,3cψ). Similarly, if (q1,2cψ) and (q2,2cψ) are
vertices of Gϕ(S,q0) with non-consuming states q1 and q2, q1 ∼ q2, and (q, ψ) is a
successor of (q1,2cψ), then (q, ψ) is also a successor of (q2,2cψ).
From Lemma 4 and 5, we obtain:
Lemma 9. If λ is a play in Gϕ(S,q0), then λ can be written as a concatenation
λ1 . . . λn where
– λj for j = 1, . . . , n− 1 is a finite sequence of states of G
ϕ
(S,q0) and λn is an
infinite sequence of states of Gϕ(S,q0),
– n can be polynomially bounded in the size of Pr,
– for all i and states v, u in λi we have that v ∼ u, and
– for all i < j, u in λi, and v in λj , we have u ≺ v.
Proof. First observe that if (q1, ψ1), (q2, ψ2), . . . is a play, then, for i < j, the
state qj is a descendant of qi, and so, either qi ∼ qj or qi ≺ qj . Now, the lemma
easily follows from Lemma 4 and 5. ⊓⊔
We now summarize some useful properties of parity games, independent of
the particular game Gϕ(S,q0).
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Lemma 10. Let λ be an infinite play in some parity game G. Assume that λ
is the concatenation λ1λ2 . . . where each λi is a non-empty sequence of vertices
such that, for each index i, the maximal color occurring in λi is even (odd). Then
the maximal color occurring in λ infinitely often is even (odd).
Proof. Let a be the maximal color occurring infinitely often in λ. Because the
set of colors is finite, there is an index i0 such that, for each i > i0, no color
a′ > a occurs in λi. Clearly, there is j > i0 such that a occurs in λj . So, a is the
maximal color occurring in λj which, by assumption, is even (odd). ⊓⊔
Before we proceed, we need to introduce some terminology.
Let G = (V, V0, V1, E, vI , l) be a parity game. A (finite) path π in G is a finite
sequence of the form v1, . . . , vn such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for every i = 1, . . . , n−1.
We say that a vertex v ∈ V is reachable in G if there exists a path from vI to
v in G. For U ⊆ V , we call π = v1, . . . , vn a (finite) U -path if π is a path and
vi ∈ U for every i = 1, . . . , n. An infinite path λ in G is a finite sequence of the
form v1, v2, . . . such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for every i ≥ 1. We call λ winning for
Player 0 if the maximum color occurring infinitely often in λ is even; otherwise
λ is winning for Player 1. We call λ an (infinite) U -path if λ is an infinite path
and vi ∈ U for every i ≥ 1.
Let U ⊆ V and let f : U → V be a function. We call f consistent with a path
v1, . . . , vn in G if vi+1 = f(vi) for every i = 1, . . . , n−1 with vi ∈ U ; analogously
for infinite paths.
Definition 2. Consider a parity game (V, V0, V1, E, vI , l). For a set U ⊆ V , a
U -strategy for Player 0 is a function f : U ∩V0 → V such that if f(v) = v′, then
(v, v′) ∈ E, and each infinite U -path consistent with f and starting with a state
reachable from vI is winning for Player 0.
Definition 3. Let f be a U -strategy for Player 0, U ⊆ V , and D ⊆ dom(f).
We say that f gives a good choice for D in a vertex v ∈ D, if for each U -
path π = v1, . . . , vn in G consistent with f such that v1 = f(v), vn ∈ D, and
vi ∈ U \D, for every 1 ≤ i < n, the maximal color occurring in π is even.
Lemma 11. Let (V, V0, V1, E, vI , l) be a parity game, U ⊆ V , f be a U -strategy
for Player 0, and D be a non-empty subset of dom(f). Then, there exists a vertex
v ∈ D such that f gives a good choice for D in v.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is no vertex v ∈ D such
that f gives a good choice for D in v. Let v0 be some element of D (recall that
D is non-empty).
Because f does not give a good choice in v0, there is a U -path π1 consistent
with f , starting in f(v0), and ending in some vertex v1 ∈ D such that the
maximal color occurring in π1 is odd. Because f does not give a good choice in
v1 we can repeat the argument and obtain a U -path π2 consistent with f , starting
with f(v1), ending in some vertex v2 ∈ D such that the maximal color occurring
in π2 is odd, and so on. In this way, we obtain an infinite path λ = π1π2 · · · ∈ Uω
consistent with f such that the maximal color on λi is odd, for every i. By Lemma
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10, it follows that λ is winning for Player 1, in contradiction to the assumption
that f is a U -strategy for Player 0. ⊓⊔
8.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that there exists a winning strategy f in Gϕ(S,q0) for Player 0. By Fact 1,
we may assume that this winning strategy is memoryless. Starting with f , we
will construct a ∼-uniform winning strategy for Player 0.
For v ∈ V , let [v] = [v]∼ = {v′ ∈ V | v ∼ v′} denote the equivalence class of
v (w.r.t. ∼). We define V/∼ = {[v]∼ | v ∈ V } to be the set of equivalence classes
of V . For each ρ ∈ V/∼, let fρ : ρ ∩ V0 → V be the restriction of f to ρ, i.e.,
fρ(v) = f(v), for each v ∈ dom(fρ) = ρ ∩ V0. (Note that fρ is a ρ-strategy for
Player 0.)
The outline of the proof is as follows: For each ρ ∈ V/∼, we will construct
f ′ρ : ρ ∩ V0 → V such that the function f
′ defined by f ′(v) = f ′[v](v), for every
v ∈ V0, is a ∼-uniform winning strategy for Player 0.
For a (possibly non-standard) subformula ψ of ϕ, we define the set Dρ(ψ) =
{v ∈ ρ | v = (q, ψ) for some non-consuming q} ⊆ ρ.
We say that a function gρ : ρ∩ V0 → V is ∼-uniform w.r.t. a set D ⊆ ρ∩ V0,
if for each v, v′ ∈ D, (a) and (b) of Definition 1 hold true for gρ.
Now, we construct f ′ρ from fρ by iteratively performing the two steps de-
scribed below, until this is not possible anymore. More precisely, let f0ρ = fρ.
Given f iρ, we obtain f
i+1
ρ : ρ∩V0 → V either by applying step A or step B below.
In the construction we use the fact that each f iρ is a ρ-strategy for Player 0 (see
Definition 2), which will be proven later.
A. Pick a subformula of ϕ of the form 3cψ such that f
i
ρ is not ∼–uniform w.r.t.
D = Dρ(3cψ). Note that f
i
ρ is an ρ-strategy for Player 0. Note also that
D is a non-empty subset of dom(f iρ). Thus, by Lemma 11, there exists a
vertex ṽ ∈ D such that f iρ gives a good choice for D in ṽ. We define f
i+1
ρ as
follows: f i+1ρ (v) = f
i
ρ(ṽ), if v ∈ D, and f
i+1
ρ (v) = f
i
ρ(v), otherwise.
B. Pick a subformula of ϕ of the form 〈〈A〉〉 dψ such that f iρ is not ∼–uniform
w.r.t. D = Dρ(〈〈A〉〉 dψ). Note that f iρ is an ρ-strategy for Player 0. Note
also that D is a non-empty subset of dom(f iρ). Thus, by Lemma 11, there
exists a node ṽ = (q̃, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ) ∈ D such that f iρ gives a good choice for D in
ṽ. We define f i+1ρ as follows: Let (q̃,2c̃ψ) = f
i
ρ(ṽ). If v = (q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ) ∈ D,
we set f i+1ρ (v) = (q,2c̃ψ), and if v /∈ D, we set f
i+1
ρ (v) = f
i
ρ(v).
It is easy to show that if f iρ is ∼–uniform w.r.t. Dρ(〈〈A〉〉 dψ) (or Dρ(3cψ)), then
f i+1ρ is also ∼-uniform w.r.t. this set. Moreover, if f
i+1
ρ is obtained by step B,
for some 〈〈A〉〉 dψ, then f i+1ρ is ∼–uniform w.r.t. the set Dρ(〈〈A〉〉 dψ). Hence,
because the number of distinct subformulas of ϕ of this form is bounded by |ϕ|,
this step can be done at most |ϕ| times. Similarly, if f i+1ρ is obtained by step A,
for some 3cψ, then f
i+1
ρ is ∼–uniform w.r.t. the set Dρ(3cψ). The number of
subformulas of ϕ of the form 3cψ is bounded by O(|ϕ| ·2n), where n is the size of
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Pr. Here we use that ϕ is I-positive, and hence, I /∈ dom(c) (see Remark 1), and
each participant, except for I, has a bounded number of available moves in each
state. Consequently, this step can also only be performed a bounded number of
times. Thus, after a bounded number of steps, say k steps, we obtain fkρ which
is ∼–uniform w.r.t Dρ(ψ), for each ψ of the form 〈〈A〉〉 dψ′ or 3cψ′. We define
f ′ρ = f
k
ρ .
Now, we prove that each f iρ is a ρ-strategy for Player 0. We proceed by
induction on i. In case i = 0, we have f0ρ = fρ and from the definition of fρ it
follows that f0ρ is a ρ-strategy for Player 0. So, suppose that f
i
ρ is a ρ-strategy
for Player 0. We will show that f i+1ρ is a ρ-strategy for Player 0 as well.
First, it is easy to show that if f i+1(v) = v′, then (v, v′) ∈ E (if f i+1 is
obtained by Step B, then it follows from Lemma 7 and the definition of Gϕ(S,q0);
if f i+1 is obtained by Step A, then we use Lemma 8).
Now, suppose that λ is an infinite ρ-path consistent with f i+1ρ and starting
with a vertex reachable from the initial state of Gϕ(S,q0). We consider two cases:
(1) There is a suffix λ′ of λ such that λ′ does not contain vertices in D. In this
case, λ′ is consistent with f iρ. Thus λ
′ it is winning for Player 0 and so is λ. (2)
λ contains an infinite number of elements in D. In this case we can split λ into
λ0λ1 . . . such that the last element of λi is the only one in λi belonging to D.
Let k > 0. Let λk = v1, . . . , vn and v0 be the last element of λk−1. So, v0, vn ∈ D
and vi /∈ D, for 0 < i < n. Now we consider two cases, depending on whether
f i+1ρ was obtain by step A or B:
– If f i+1ρ was obtained by step A, then v1 = f
i
ρ(ṽ) is the successor of ṽ for which
f iρ gives a good choice. By definition of a good choice for D, the maximal
color occurring in λk = v1, . . . , vn is even.
– If f i+1ρ was obtained by step B, then v1 is of the form (q,2c̃ψ), where
(q̃,2c̃ψ) = f
i
ρ(ṽ) is the successor of ṽ for which f
i
ρ gives a good choice for
D. Because v2 is a successor of (q,2c̃ψ) and q, q̃ ∈ ρ are non-consuming, by
Lemma 8, we have that v2 is also a successor of (q̃,2c̃ψ). Hence, the path
ṽ, (q̃,2c̃ψ), v2, . . . , vn is consistent with f
i
ρ. Note also that (q̃,2c̃ψ)) /∈ D. So,
by the definition of a good choice, the maximal color on (q̃,2c̃ψ), v2, . . . , vn is
even. Because the colors of (q̃,2c̃ψ) and (q,2c̃ψ) are the same, the maximal
color on λk = v1, . . . , vn is also even.
So, in the both cases, we have proven that the maximal color on λk is even.
Thus, by Lemma 10, the path λ1λ2 . . . is winning for Player 0 and so is λ.
This shows that f i+1ρ is a ρ-strategy for Player 0. In particular, f
′
ρ is a ρ-
strategy for Player 0. We define f ′(v) = f ′[v](v) for every v ∈ V0. It remains to
show that f ′ is a ∼-uniform winning strategy for Player 0.
We know that f ′ρ is ∼-uniform w.r.t Dρ(ψ), for each ψ of the form 〈〈A〉〉 dψ
′
or 3cψ
′. From this it is easy to conclude that f ′ is ∼-uniform.
To prove that f ′ is winning for Player 0, let us consider some play λ consistent
with f ′. By Lemma 9, there is a suffix λ′ of λ such that λ′ is an infinite ρ-path
for some equivalence class ρ. Because λ′ is consistent with f ′ and, for each v ∈ ρ,
37
we have that f ′(v) = f ′ρ(v), the infinite path λ
′ is consistent with f ′ρ as well.
Since f ′ρ is an ρ-strategy, we can conclude that λ
′ is winning for Player 0, and
hence, so is λ. ⊓⊔
8.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Given Pr, S = SPr, q
0 (the initial state of S), and an I-positive AMC-formula
in negation normal form as above, and Gϕ(S,q0) in this section we proof Lemma 2.
We first show that the branching degree of Gϕ(S,q0) is bounded exponentially.
This is true independent of whether or not the underlying strategy is ∼-uniform.
Lemma 12. The branching degree of a strategy graph of Player 0 of Gϕ(S,q0) is
exponentially bounded |Pr|.
Proof. By the definition of Gϕ(S,q0), the only vertices of G
ϕ
(S,q0) which can have
more than two successors are of the form (q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ), (q, JAK dψ), (q,3cψ), and
(q,2cψ). Vertices of the form (q, 〈〈A〉〉 dψ) and (q,3cψ) belong to V0, so in any
strategy graph for Player 0 these vertices have exactly one successor. Hence, it
suffices to check that the number of successors in Gϕ(S,q0) of vertices of the form
(q, JAK dψ) and (q,2cψ) is exponentially bounded in |Pr|.
Let us first consider the case of v = (q, JAK dψ). Because ϕ is I-positive,
we know that I /∈ A. Hence, A contains only some honest principals and some
secure channels. Each successor of v corresponds to some combination of moves
of players in A, so the number of successors of v is |∆Aq |. Since the number of
moves available to each honest principal and to each secure channel is linear in
|Pr|, |∆Aq | is exponentially bounded in |Pr|.
Now, let us consider the case of v = (q,2cψ). Because ϕ is I-positive, we
have that I ∈ dom(c). Each successor of v corresponds to some c-successor of q,
i.e. to some combination of moves of players in B = Σ \ dom(c). Hence, one can
identify every such successor with exactly one element of ∆Bq . From the previous
case, we know already that |∆Bq | is exponentially bounded in |Pr|. ⊓⊔
The following lemmas states that in a path in Gϕ(S,q0) one cannot stay long in a
state with the same first component, i.e., the same state of S, without repeating
the second component, i.e., the subformula of ϕ.
Lemma 13. For every path (q, ψ1), . . . , (q, ψn) in G
ϕ
(S,q0) with ψi 6= ψj, for
every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= j, it holds that n ≤ 2|ϕ| + 1.
Proof. If ψi is non-standard, then ψi+1 is standard (by the definition of Sub
q
S(ϕ),
symbols 2c and 3c are not nested). Thus, at least xn/2y formulas amongst
ψ1 . . . , ψn are standard. Because there is at most |ϕ| standard subformulas of ϕ,
we can conclude that n ≤ 2|ϕ| + 1. ⊓⊔
The following lemma states properties of paths consisting of equivalent states.
38
Lemma 14. Let v1, . . . , vn be a path in G
ϕ
(S,q0) such that vi ∼ vj , for every
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then:
1. For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, if vi = (qi,2cψ) and vj = (qj ,2cψ), then
vi+1 = vj+1.
2. For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n−2}, if vi = (qi, JAK dψ) and vj = (qj , JAK dψ), then
vi+1 = (qi,3cψ) and vj+1 = (qj ,3cψ), for some c.
Proof. In both cases, the choices made in vi and vj represent choices of some
honest principals and some scheduled secure channels, but not choices of the
intruder. These choices cannot change the state of these agents: in case 1, this
is because vi ∼ vi+1 and vj ∼ vj+1, and in case 2, it is because vi ∼ vi+2 and
vj ∼ vj+2. So, the choices are uniquely determined and correspond to the choice
of staying in the same state for honest players, and to the choice of not delivering
any message by the scheduled secure channels (recall that since the protocol is
assumed to be dssc-free, these scheduled secure channels only get their messages
from honest principals). ⊓⊔
In what follows, we call a vertex v of Gϕ(S,q0) modal if it is of the form (q, 〈〈A〉〉
dψ)
or (q, JAK dψ).
Lemma 15. Let v1, . . . , vn be a path in a ∼-uniform strategy graph for Player 0
in the game Gϕ(S,q0) such that vi ∼ vj, for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the vertices
v1, . . . , vn are non-consuming. Let, for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}, the vertices vi
and vj be modal and of the form vi = (qi, ψ) and vj = (qj , ψ). Then, we have
vi+2 = vj+2.
Proof. We consider two cases:
Case 1 : ψ = 〈〈A〉〉 dψ′. By the definition of ∼-uniform strategy, there exists c
such that vi+1 = (qi,2cψ) and vj+1 = (qj ,2cψ). Thus, by Lemma 14, we obtain
vi+2 = vj+2.
Case 2 : ψ = JAK dψ′. By Lemma 14, there exists c such that vi+1 = (qi,3cψ) and
vj+1 = (qj ,3cψ). Thus, we obtain vi+2 = vj+2 by the definition of ∼-uniform
strategy. ⊓⊔
Let H be a ∼-uniform strategy graph of Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0). A path v1, . . . , vn
in H is conservative, if, for all i 6= j we have that vi 6= vj and vi ∼ vj .
Lemma 16. Let π = v1, . . . , vn be a conservative path in a ∼–uniform strategy
graph of Player 0 in the game Gϕ(S,q0). If v1 is consuming, then n ≤ 2|ϕ| + 1.
Proof. Assume that vi is of the form (qi, ψi) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let k be maximal
such that qi = q1 for all i ≤ k. By Lemma 13, k ≤ 2|ϕ| + 1. We will show that
n = k, which gives n ≤ 2|ϕ|+1. By the sake of contradiction, suppose that k < n.
So, qk+1 6= qk, and thus qk+1 must be a successor of qk. By the assumption, the
state qk = q1 is consuming, so by Lemma 6, we have qk ≺ qk+1, which contradicts
the assumption that π is conservative. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 17. Let v1, . . . , vn be a conservative path in a ∼–uniform strategy graph
for Player 0 in the game Gϕ(S,q0). If v1, . . . , vn are non-consuming, then the num-
ber of modal vertices in v1, . . . , vn is bounded by |ϕ| + 2.
Proof. We will show that a modal subformula of ϕ cannot occur twice in the path
v1, . . . , vn−2, which means that the number of modal vertices in v1, . . . , vn−2 is
bounded by the number of distinct modal subformulas of ϕ, and hence, is ≤ |ϕ|.
Consequently, the number of modal vertices in v1, . . . , vn is bounded by |ϕ|+ 2.
Suppose that, for i, j ≤ n − 2 we have vi = (qi, ψ) and vj = (qj , ψ), for a
modal formula ψ. By Lemma 15, vi+2 = vj+2, which contradicts the assumption
that v1, . . . , vn is conservative. ⊓⊔
Lemma 18. Let π = v1, . . . , vn be a conservative path in a ∼–uniform strategy
graph of Player 0 in the game Gϕ(S,q0). If v1, . . . , vn are non-consuming, then
n ≤ p(|ϕ|) for some fixed polynomial p in |ϕ|.
Proof. We split π into π0, . . . , πm such that for each u, v in πi the first compo-
nents of u and v are the same and, if v = (qv, ψv) is the last element of πi and
u = (qu, ψu) is the first element of πi+1, then qv 6= qu.
For 0 ≤ i < m, the second component of the last element of πi has to be
a non-standard formula. Moreover, for 0 < i ≤ m, the second component of
the first element of πi is standard. Hence, for 0 < i < m, πi has at least two
elements. A predecessor of a vertex with a non-standard formula is modal, so
each πi, for 0 < i < m, contains a modal element. Hence, by Lemma 17, we
obtain m ≤ |ϕ|+ 4. By Lemma 13, the length of each πi is bounded by 2|ϕ|+ 1,
so we conclude that n ≤ (2|ϕ| + 1)(|ϕ| + 4) =: p(|ϕ|). ⊓⊔
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 2. First, by Lemma 12, the branching degree
of a strategy graph of Player 0 is exponentially bounded. Below, we show that
every path in Gϕ(S,q0) starting from the initial state of G
ϕ
(S,q0) without repetitions
has length polynomially bounded in |Pr| + |ϕ|. This shows the first part of
Lemma 2 and from this, together with the bounded branching degree, the lemma
follows.
Let π be a path without repetitions in a∼–uniform strategy graph of Player 0.
Let v1, . . . , vn be a subsequence of π such that vi ∼ vj , for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. By
Lemma 9, the number of maximal subsequences of π of this type is at most
polynomial in |Pr|. Thus, to prove a polynomial bound on the length of π, it is
enough to show that n is polynomially bounded in |Pr| + |ϕ|.
Observe that v1, . . . , vn is conservative. Thus, if v1, . . . , vn does not contain
any consuming vertex, then, by Lemma 18, n is polynomially bounded. Other-
wise, let k be the smallest index such that vk is consuming. By Lemma 18, k is
polynomially bounded in |ϕ| and, by Lemma 16, n− k is polynomially bounded
in |ϕ| as well. Hence, we obtain a polynomial bound on n as desired. ⊓⊔
8.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Given Pr, S = SPr, q
0 (the initial state of S), and an I-positive AMC-formula ϕ
in negation normal form as above, and Gϕ(S,q0) in this section we proof Lemma 3.
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To do so, we need to bound the size of messages used in a winning strategy graph.
The main idea is to (iteratively) replace certain (unnecessarily big) messages by
new atoms in such a way that the resulting graph is still a winning strategy
graph. For this purpose, we first characterize the set d(E) of terms derivable
from E in terms of what we call intruder rules and study how the replacement
of terms by other terms effects the derivability of terms.
For a term t the set Sub(t) of subterms of t is defined as usual. We extend
Sub(·) to sets of terms, multi terms, a-rules and a-instance for a ∈ H, and
protocols as expected.
The intruder rules that we use include those introduced in [22]. In addition,
we need rules for hashing, signatures, and generating new atoms. In what follows,
we often write E,m and m,m′ instead of E ∪ {m} and {m,m′}, respectively.
An intruder rule L is of the form E → m where E is a finite set of mes-
sages and m is a message. A rule of this form is also called m-rule since m is
generated. Given a set E′, L can be applied to E′ if E ⊆ E′. The rule L in-
duces a binary relation →L on finite sets of messages: →L= {(E′, E′ ∪ {m}) |
L can be applied to E′}. If L is a set of intruder rules, then →L=
⋃
L∈L →L.
For a binary relation → we write E → E′ instead of → (E,E′). The reflexive
and transitive closure of → is denoted by →∗.
To characterize d(E), we consider the following set of intruder rules. In what
follows, the notion “intruder rule” will always refer to the rules introduced below.
This set is partitioned into decomposition and composition rules. Accordingly,
we call a rule decomposition and composition rule, respectively.
Decomposition rules are of one of the following forms, where m and m′ are
messages and k ∈ K (and thus, k−1 ∈ K):





Composition rules are of one of the following forms, where m,m′ are some mes-
sages, k, k0, k1, k2 ∈ K, and aI ∈ AI :
1. m,m′ → 〈m,m′〉.
2. m,m′ → {m}sm′ .
3. m, k → {m}ak.
4. m→ hash(m).
5. m, k−1 → sig(k,m).
6. → aI .




{E′ | E →∗L E
′}.
A derivation is of the form E0 →L0 E1 →L1 E2 →L2 · · · →Ln−1 En where
Ei →Li Ei+1 for every i. We call n the length of the derivation. We know
that for every m ∈ d(E) there exists n, intruder rules L0, . . . , Ln−1, and sets
E0, . . . , En such that E0 = E, m ∈ En, and there is a derivation from E0 to En
41
as above. We call such a derivation a derivation form of length n. The derivation
is minimal if no step can be removed such that the resulting sequence is still a
derivation for m. Clearly, for every m ∈ d(E) there exists a minimal derivation.
We write m ∈ dc(E) if there exists a minimal derivation of m where the last rule
is a composition rule. The following fact is well-known (see, e.g., [22]).
Lemma 19. Let m ∈ d(E) and let D be a minimal derivation of m from E such
that D ends with a decomposition rule. Then, m ∈ Sub(E).
From this lemma, we obtain:
Lemma 20. Let E be a set of messages and let τ be a message such that τ 6∈
Sub(E) and τ 6∈ dc(E). Then for all m ∈ d(E) we have that τ 6∈ Sub(m).
Proof. Let D = E0 →L1 E1 · · · →Ln En be a derivation of m from E0 = E.
Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that τ ∈ Sub(m). Then, there exists
a minimal i 6= 0 such that τ ∈ Sub(Ei) since τ is a subterm of En. Assume that
Li is an s-rule for some s. Then, τ is a subterm of s. If τ is a proper subterm
of s, by the definition of intruder rules, it follows that τ is a subterm of Ei−1,
in contradiction to the minimality of i. Thus, τ = s and therefore, τ ∈ d(E).
Since τ 6∈ dc(E) it follows that all derivations of τ end with a decomposition
rule. Hence, by Lemma 19, τ ∈ Sub(E), in contradiction to the assumption that
τ 6∈ Sub(E). Hence, τ 6∈ Sub(m).
Let
Derive = {(E,m) | m ∈ d(E)}
where E and m are given as DAGs be the derivation problem. The following is
well-known (see, e.g., [8]):
Lemma 21. Derive can be decided in polynomial time.
We now study which messages can be derived from a set of messages if certain
terms are replaced by other terms.
Definition 4. Let t, t′ and t′′ be terms. By t|t′→t′′ we denote the term obtained
from t by simultaneously replacing any occurrence of t′ in t by t′′.
For a set T of terms we define T|t′→t′′ = {t|t′→t′′ | t ∈ T }. For a sequence s =
t1 · · · tn of terms the sequence s|t′→t′′ is defined by s|t′→t′′ = t1|t′→t′′ · · · tn|t′→t′′ .
For a substitution σ we denote by σ|t′→t′′ the substitution σ
′ with the same
domain as σ and σ′(x) = σ(x)|t′→t′′ for all x ∈ dom(σ). For a multi message
m : A→ M◦ for some A ⊆ C, we denote bym|t′→t′′ the multi messagem
′ : A→
M◦ with m′(c) =m(c)|t′→t′′ for all c ∈ A. For C,D ⊆ C and a (C,D)-rule R =
r⇒ s the rule R|t′→t′′ is defined by R|t′→t′′ = r|t′→t′′ ⇒ s|t′→t′′ . For a principal
P = (V,E, r, λ, l) the principal P|t′→t′′ is defined by P|t′→t′′ = (V,E, r, λ, l
′)
where for (v, v′) ∈ E the label l′(v, v′) is defined by l′(v, v′) = l(v, v′)|t′→t′′ . For
a state q = (K, P ,m, {(sc, dc)}c∈SC) of SPr we define
q|t′→t′′ = (K|t′→t′′ , {Pa|t′→t′′}a∈H, {ma|t′→t′′}a∈H, {(sc|t′→t′′ , dc)}c∈SC) .
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For a formula ψ of the form 3cψ
′ or 2cψ
′, we set ψ|t′→t′′ = 3c′ψ
′ or ψ|t′→t′′ =
2c′ψ
′, respectively, where c′(I) = c(I)|t′→t′′ , in case I ∈ dom(c), and c
′(a) =
c(a) for a ∈ dom(c) \ {I}. If ψ is not of the form 3cψ′ or 2cψ′, we define
ψ|t′→t′′ = ψ. For a state α = (q, ψ) of G
ϕ
(S,q0) we set α|t′→t′′ = (q|t′→t′′ , ψ|t′→t′′ ).
For a subgraph F of Gϕ(S,q0) the graph F|t′→t′′ is defined in the obvious way.
The following lemma was proved in [13].
Lemma 22. Let E be a set of messages and τ, τ ′ be messages. Then, τ ∈ dc(E \
{τ}) implies d(E)|τ→τ ′ ⊆ d(E|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}).
In order to define messages that can be replaced by an intruder atom from AI ,
we need to know how variables are substituted in instances. Therefore, we now
define substitutions that keep track of this information. More specifically, let
ρ = q0, q1, . . . , ql
be a rooted path in the concurrent game structure S = SPr (induced by protocol
Pr), i.e., q0 = q
0 is the initial state of S and qi+1 is a successor of qi as defined
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i,a for i ∈ {0, . . . , l− 1} .
We set σρ = σ
ρ
l . For a substitution σ and terms t and t
′ we say that t is a
σ-match of t′ (t ⊑σ t′) if t is not a variable and tσ = t′. Now we define for a
message m what it means that m does not match with a rooted path in S or
Gϕ(S,q0).
Definition 5. Let ρ = q0, q1, . . . , ql be a rooted path in S. A message m does
not match with ρ if t 6⊑σρ m for all t ∈ Sub(Pr) ∪ AI .
Let α = α0, α1, . . . , αl be a rooted path in G
ϕ
(S,q0) where αi = (qi, ψi). Let
0 = i0 < i1 < · · · < ik ≤ l such that
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– qik = ql,
– qis 6= qis+1 for all s ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, and
– qis = qis+1 = · · · = qis+1−1 for all s ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Then ρ = qi0 , qi1 , . . . , qik is a rooted path in S and we call ρ the S-projection of
α. A messagem does not match with α ifm does not match with the S-projection
of α.
The following lemma states that a message that does not match with a rooted
path ρ in S can be replaced by a new intruder atom from AI and after this
replacement one still has a rooted path in S with essentially the same properties.
In particular, at the end of the rooted path the intruder can derive exactly the
same constants as he could before the replacement.
Lemma 23. Let
ρ = q0, q1, . . . , ql
be a rooted path in S. Let τ be a message that does not match with ρ. Further-
more, let aI ∈ AI be a constant that does not occur anywhere in ρ or Pr, and
define
ρ′ = q′0, q
′
1, . . . , q
′
l
where q′j = qj |τ→aI . Then, the following is true:
1) ρ′ is a rooted path in S.
2) For each j ∈ {0, . . . , l} and a ∈ H we have ∆(q′j , a) = ∆(qj , a).
3) For each j ∈ {0, . . . , l} we have that ∆(qj , I)|τ→aI ⊆ ∆(q
′
j , I).
4) For each j ∈ {0, . . . , l}, a ∈ H, and b ∈ P we have that ∆(q′j , sch(a, b)) =
∆(qj , sch(a, b)).
5) We have that π(ql) = π(q
′
l).
Proof. First, assume that τ does not occur as a subterm anywhere in ρ. Then
ρ′ = ρ and nothing is to show. In what follows, we show the properties claimed
for ρ′ under the assumption that τ occurs in ρ. The proof is organized in three
steps. First, we will prove that the intruder can derive message τ when it first
occurs in ρ. Second, with this proved we show some auxiliary claims for the
states q′i. Third, with these auxiliary claims we show claims 1) to 5) from above.
Before starting with the first step described above we introduce some nota-
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a. We also introduce primed versions of these symbols,





First step. Now we show that the intruder can derive τ , even with a composition
rule at the end of a minimal derivation, when it first occurs in ρ. We call (*) the
property of τ that t 6⊑σl τ for all t ∈ Sub(Pr) ∪ AI .
We know that there is i ∈ {0, . . . , l} such that τ occurs in qi. Let p ∈ {0, . . . , l}
be minimal such that τ occurs in qp. We first show the following three claims:
i) p > 0,
ii) there is a channel c of the form net(e, a) or dir(d, a) where a ∈ H, d ∈ D, and
e ∈ P such that τ ∈ Sub(mpa(c)), and
iii) τ does not occur in components of qp other then those described in ii).
Claim i): From (*) it follows that τ 6∈ Sub(Pr) ∪AI . Since initially there are no
messages on secure channels and no messages on channels to honest instances τ
does not occur in q0.
Claim ii) and iii): We show that τ can not occur in components of qp other
than those described in ii). First assume that τ occurs in some scheduled secure
channel, i.e., there is c ∈ SC such that spc contains τ . Let m be a message in s
p
c
that contains τ . Thus, m has to be sent in a step before step p by an honest
instance, i.e., there is s < p such that m = ssaσs. From (*) it follows that there
is a variable x in the domain of σs such that τ ∈ Sub(σs(x)). By definition of
a-instances x occurs in step s or before in ρ. From this we get that τ occurs
in a step before step p. This contradicts the minimality of p. Second, assume
that τ occurs in Kp. Since all messages in Kp are in K0 or are sent by honest
principals to the intruder by a similar argument to the one used in the first case
we get a contradiction to the minimality of p. Third, assume that τ occurs in an
instance of qp. By a similar argument to the one used in the first case we get a
contradiction to the minimality of p. This concludes the proof of Claim ii) and
iii).
Now we can show that (**) τ ∈ dc(Kp). From ii) and iii) it follows that
τ 6∈ Sub(Kp) and τ ∈ Sub(d(Kp)). By Lemma 20 we get that τ ∈ d
c(Kp).
Second step. We now do the second step of the proof, i.e., we show auxiliary
claims about q′i needed to prove claims 1) to 5). More precisely, by induction on
0 ≤ j ≤ l using (**) from above we will show that the following claims hold:
a) q′j is a state of S,
b) for each a ∈ H and j < l we have ∆(q′j , a) = ∆(qj , a),
c) d(Kj)|τ→aI ⊆ d(K
′
j),
d) for each a ∈ H and b ∈ P , with sch(a, b) ∈ ch(Pr), we have that∆(q′j , sch(a, b)) =
∆(qj , sch(a, b)), and
e) if j < l then q′j+1 is a successor of q
′
j .
First, assume j = 0. Claims a),b),d) are obviously fulfilled since q′0 = q0. To
show claim c) we distinguish between two cases:
– τ ∈ d(K0): By (*) we know that τ 6∈ Sub(K0). By Lemma 20 we get that
τ ∈ dc(K0)(= dc(K0 \ {τ})). By Lemma 22 we get c).
45
– τ 6∈ d(K0): Since we have that τ 6∈ Sub(K0), by Lemma 20, we know that
for all m ∈ d(K0) we have that τ 6∈ Sub(m). Thus, we have d(K0)|τ→aI =
d(K0) = d(K0|τ→aI ) = d(K
′
0).
To show claim e) we distinguish between two cases:
– p > 1: We have q′1 = q1 and thus we have that q
′
1 is a successor of q
′
0 = q0.
– p = 1: Choose the ports which carry messages that contain τ . By the points
above we have that the intruder can derive these messages and τ does not
occur in other components of q1. Thus, we have that q
′
1 is a successor of
q′0 = q0.
For the induction step assume that a) to e) are true for a j − 1. We want to
proof the statements for j > 0. Claim a) is fulfilled by induction and claim e)
for j − 1.
To prove claim b) we have to show that∆(qj , a) = ∆(q
′
j , a). For this it suffices
to show that if a message m matches with a term t occurring in the left-hand
side of a rule in qj for a ∈ H, then m|τ→aI matches with t|τ→aI and vice versa.
More precisely, let v ∈ V ja be a successor of r
j




a, v) = r ⇒ s. Let
t = r(c) for some c ∈ dom(r).
First, suppose thatm =mja(c)matches with t, i.e.,m = tσ for some substitu-
tion σ. We have to show that m|τ→aI matches with t|τ→aI , i.e., we have to show
that there is a substitution σ′ such that m|τ→aI = t|τ→aIσ
′. Let t0 = l0a(r
j
a, v),
i.e., t0 is the term in P 0a = Pa that corresponds to t. We have that
m|τ→aI = tσ|τ→aI




= t0(σj ∪ σ)|τ→aI
= t0(σj |τ→aI ∪ σ|τ→aI )
= (t0(σj |τ→aI ))σ|τ→aI
⊕
= (t0σj)|τ→aIσ|τ→aI = t|τ→aIσ|τ→aI
where all steps are obviously fulfilled by definition, except for the steps marked
with ⊕: For these steps, we use property (*) from above. Thus, m|τ→aI matches
with t|τ→aI .
Now, conversely, suppose that m|τ→aI matches with t|τ→aI , i.e., m|τ→aI =
t|τ→aIσ for some substitution σ. We have to show that m matches with t, i.e.,
m = tσ′ for some substitution σ′. Using the fact that aI is a new intruder atom
we have that
m = (m|τ→aI )|aI→τ
= (t|τ→aIσ)|aI→τ
= (t|τ→aI |aI→τ
)σ|aI→τ = tσ|aI→τ .
Thus, m matches with t.
To show claim c) we distinguish between two cases:
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– τ ∈ d(Kj): First, assume that j ≥ p. By (**), we have that τ ∈ dc(Kj \ {τ}).
By Lemma 22 we get the desired fact. Second, assume that j < p. We have
that τ 6∈ Sub(Kj). Thus, by Lemma 20, we have that τ ∈ d
c(Kj \ {τ}). By
Lemma 22 we get the desired fact.
– τ 6∈ d(Kj): In this case we know that j < p − 1. Thus, we have that τ 6∈
Sub(Kj). From this, by Lemma 20, it follows that for every m ∈ d(Kj) we
have τ 6∈ Sub(m) and therefore
d(Kj)|τ→aI = d(Kj) = d(Kj |τ→aI ) = d(K
′
j) .
To prove claim d) we have to show that ∆(q′j , sch(a, b)) = ∆(qj , sch(a, b)). By
definition of q′j we know that each scheduled secure channel sch(a, b) contains as
many messages as in qj . Thus, we have ∆(q
′
j , sch(a, b)) = ∆(qj , sch(a, b)).
To prove claim e) we have to show that if j < l, then q′j+1 is a successor of q
′
j . If
j < l then we know that qj+1 is a successor of qj since ρ is a path in S. Let γ ∈ ∆Σqj
be a total move such that δ(qj , γ) = qj+1. Let γ
′ be defined by γ′(a) = γ(a)
for a ∈ H ∪ SC and γ′(I) = γ(I)|τ→aI . By claims b),c), and d) we get that
γ′ ∈ ∆Σq′j
. Now we have to show that δ(q′j , γ
′) = q′j+1, i.e., we have to show that
δ(q′j , γ
′) = δ(qj , γ)|τ→aI . With similar arguments as used for claim b) one shows










(m|τ→aI , P|τ→aI ). With this it is easy to see that δ(q
′
j , γ
′) = δ(qj , γ)|τ→aI .
Third step. Now we are ready to prove claims 1) to 5) using claims a) to e)
from above. Claim 1) is a direct consequence of points a) and e). Claims 2), 3),
and 4) follow directly from b), c), and d), respectively. To show claim 5) we first
show that for each atom c we have that c ∈ d(Kl) iff c ∈ d(K′l). The implication
from left to right follows from c) and the fact that c 6= τ . The implication in
the other direction, follows from Lemma 22 if we set E to be Kq′
l
, set τ (from
Lemma 22) to be aI , and τ
′ to be τ (from the lemma proved here). For all other
propositional variables p it is obvious that p ∈ π(ql) iff p ∈ π(q′l). 2
The following lemma states that in paths α of Gϕ(S,q0) starting in the initial
vertex of Gϕ(S,q0) messages that do not match with α can be replaced by new
constants and after this replacement one still has a path in Gϕ(S,q0).
Lemma 24. Let
α = α0, α1, . . . , αl
be a rooted path in Gϕ(S,q0). Let τ be a message that does not match with α.
Furthermore, let aI ∈ AI be a constant that does not occur anywhere in α and
Pr, and define
α′ = α′0, α
′
1, . . . , α
′
l
where α′j = αj |τ→aI . Then we have that α
′ is a rooted path in Gϕ(S,q0).
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Proof. First, assume that τ does not occur as a subterm anywhere in α. Then
α′ = α and nothing is to show. Now, assume that τ occurs in α. For i ∈ {0, . . . , l}




i). Let ρ = qi0 , qi1 , . . . , qik be the S-projection of α. By Lemma 23
we know that ρ′ = q′i0 , q
′
i1
, . . . , q′ik is a rooted path in S. With statements 2),3),
and 4) of Lemma 23 we can conclude that α′ is a rooted path in Gϕ(S,q0). ⊓⊔
Let F be a finite subgraph of Gϕ(S,q0) such that the initial vertex α0 of G
ϕ
(S,q0)
is present in F and all vertices α in F are reachable from α0 in F . A vertex
α ∈ F is called S-maximal if there is no descendant α′ of α in F such that an
a-instance in α′ differs from an a-instance in α, for some a ∈ H.
We call a path in Gϕ(S,q0) simple if it is repetition free, i.e., all vertices in this
path are pairwise distinct.
Definition 6. Let F be a finite subgraph of Gϕ(S,q0) such that the initial vertex
α0 of G
ϕ
(S,q0) is present in F and all vertices α of F are reachable from α0 in
F . Let M be the set of S-maximal vertices in F . Let R be the set of all simple
paths in F from α0 to some vertex in M . Let R
′ be the set of all S-projections
of paths in R. Let T be the set of all substitutions σρ with ρ ∈ R′. A message m
does not match with F if for all substitutions σ ∈ T and all t ∈ Sub(Pr) ∪ AI
we have that m 6⊑σ t.
We now can extend Lemma 24 to subgraphs of Gϕ(S,q0).
Lemma 25. Let F be a winning strategy graph for Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0). Let τ
be a message that does not match with F . Let aI ∈ AI be a constant that does
not occur anywhere in F and Pr. Then F|τ→aI is a winning strategy graph for
Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0).
Proof. Let F ′ = F|τ→aI . We have to show the following two points:
1) F ′ is a strategy graph for Player 0 in Gϕ(S,q0).
2) F ′ is winning for Player 0.
1) By claim 1) of Lemma 24 we get that F ′ is a subgraph of Gϕ(S,q0). Thus, it
suffices to show that for all vertices α of Player 1 in F ′ all successors of α|τ→aI
in Gϕ(S,q0) are present in F
′.
Let α = (q|τ→aI , ψ|τ→aI ) be a vertex of Player 1 in F
′. Then, by definition,
(q, ψ) is a vertex of Player 1 in F . We distinguish between the different forms of
formula ψ. First, if ψ is of the form
ψ1 ∧ ψ2, p, ¬p, X, µX.ψ or νX.ψ,
then we have that the only successor of (q, ψ) in Gϕ(S,q0) is of the form (q, ψ
′) for
some ψ′. Since F is a strategy graph for Player 0 we know that (q, ψ′) is present
in F . Thus, (q|τ→aI , ψ
′
|τ→aI ) is present in F
′. By definition of Gϕ(S,q0), we know
that (q|τ→aI , ψ
′
|τ→aI ) is the only successor of α in F
′.
Second, if ψ is of the form 2cψ
′ or JAK dψ′, then we know that the choices
of players that have to be specified are choices of honest participants of the
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protocol Pr or scheduled secure channels, because ϕ is I-positive. Since F is a
strategy graph for Player 0 we know that each such choice, there is a unique
successor (q′, ψ′) of (q, ψ) in F . Now, by condition 2) and 4) of Lemma 23, we
can conclude that all successors of α are present in F ′.
2) Obviously, it suffices to check that for all vertices (q, ψ) ∈ F the evaluation of
propositional variables in (q, ψ) and (q|τ→aI , ψ|τ→aI ) is the same. This follows
directly from point 5) of Lemma 23. ⊓⊔
Now we can prove Lemma 3. The idea of the proof is to repeatedly apply Lemma
25 to a given winning strategy graph F for Player 0 with an exponential num-
ber of vertices to obtain a winning strategy graph F ′ for Player 0 in which all
messages occurring as a subterm in F ′ match with F ′. By this fact and the ex-
ponential number of vertices in F ′ we obtain the exponential bound of the size
of F ′ as desired.
Proof (Lemma 3). Let F be a winning strategy graph for Player 0 in the game
Gϕ(S,q0) such that the number of vertices of F is exponentially bounded and for
each vertex α ∈ F the length of any simple path from the initial vertex to α in F
is polynomially bounded. Thus, the number of simple paths in F from the initial
vertex in F to S-maximal vertices in F is exponentially bounded. By Lemma
25, we may assume that all messages occurring as subterms in F match with F .
Since the number of substitutions as described in Definition 5 is exponentially
bounded, it is easy to see that F can be represented in size exponentially bounded
in |Pr| + |ϕ| by representing the set of all messages occurring in F by a single
DAG. 2
8.7 Lower Bound
In this section, we prove that the problem Pamc(greedy, dssc-containing, I-posi-
tive) is NEXPTIME-hard. The proof is by reduction from the the exponentially
bounded tiling problem, a known NEXPTIME-hard problem.
The exponentially bounded tiling problem is defined as follows (see, e.g., [6]):
Given is a finite set U of tiles, two relations H,V ⊆ U ×U , two tiles u0, uf ∈ U ,
and an integer (encoded in unary) m > 0. The question is whether it is possible
to tile a (2m × 2m)-square so that the horizontal neighbors belong to H , vertical
neighbors belong to V , the left-top tile is u0, and the left-bottom tile is uf . More
formally, the question is whether there exists a function t : {0, . . . , 2m−1}2 → U
such that
(i) 〈t(i, j), t(i+ 1, j)〉 ∈ H , for all 0 ≤ i < 2m − 1, and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1,
(ii) 〈t(i, j), t(i, j + 1)〉 ∈ V , for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 1, and 0 ≤ j < 2m − 1,
(iii) t(0, 0) = u0 and t(0, 2
m − 1) = uf .
The function t is called a solution of the given tiling problem.
Given an instance T of this problem, i.e., given U , H , V , m, u0, and uf as
above, we now (efficiently) construct a protocol Pr and an AMC-formula ϕ such
that (SPr, q
0) |= ϕ where q0 is the initial state of ϕ iff T has a solution.
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The formula (presented as an ATL-formula) is
ϕ = 〈〈I〉〉3pc
for some propositional variable pc. Note that ϕ is independent of T , and hence,
is fixed. Therefore and using Theorem 1, stating ϕ as an ATL-formula is w.l.o.g.
We now define Pr (which depends on T ). The constants used in Pr are
c, e, h, v and the elements of U , where the constants e, h, v stand for “equal”,
“horizontal”, and “vertical”, and will be used as keys.
Potential solutions of tiling problems will be represented by messages that
encode binary trees of depth 2 ·m, using the pairing operator, with elements of
U as their leafs. So, every path in such a tree has length 2 ·m. The first m steps
of such a path represent an integer i (encoded as bit string of length m) which
stands for a column in the (2m×2m)-square. Analogously, the remainingm steps
of the path represent an integer j which stands for a row in the (2m×2m)-square.
The node the path is leading to represents the tile at position (i, j) in the square.
Following this intuition, we introduce the following notation: For a term
s and a sequence a ∈ {0, 1}∗, we recursively define s[a] as follows: s[ǫ] = s;
s[0a′] = s′[a′], if s = 〈s′, s′′〉, and otherwise s[0a′] is undefined; s[1a′] = s′′[a′],
if s = 〈s′, s′′〉, and otherwise s[1a′] is undefined. Furthermore, for a term s and
integers i, j ∈ {0, . . . , 2m − 1}, we write s[i, j] for s[ab], where a ∈ {0, 1}m is
the binary representation of i (with leading zeros, if necessary), b ∈ {0, 1}m is
the binary representation of j, and ab stands for the concatenation of the m-
bit string a and b. Now, a function t : {0, . . . , 2m − 1}2 → U (thus a potential
solution of a tiling problem) can be represented by a term s such that, for each
0 ≤ i, j < 2m, the expression s[i, j] is defined and s[i, j] = t(i, j). In that case, s
is called the term representation of t. We call the term s[i, j] (if defined) a cell
of t.
The honest principals of Pr are A0, . . . A2m+1. We also have one dishonest
principal B, which we call the the initiator. (Recall that B will be played by the
intruder.) The initial intruder knowledge is U .
The idea is that the initiator guess a solution of T (encoded by a message)
and then the principals A0, . . . A2m+1 are used to check whether the message
is in fact a solution. More precisely, the message is sent by the initiator to A0,
converted in some way by A0 and sent to A1 over a direct secure channel, then
converted again by A1 and then sent to A2 over a direct secure channel, and so
on, until the message reaches A2m+1, who will possibly output c to the initiator.
The principals A0, . . . , A2m+1 are defined in such a way that if the message given
by the initiator to A0 is in fact a solution, then no matter what the choices of
the Ai are, at the end A2m+1 will output c. Otherwise, if the initiator did not
send a solution, there will be at least one choice of the Ai such that A2m+1 does
not output c.
We now describe the behavior of the honest principals in detail: While we
do not formally define these principals in terms of trees, doing this is straight-
forward. We abbreviate messages of the form 〈m1, 〈m2, 〈· · · 〈mn−1,mn〉 · · ·〉〉〉 by
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉.
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– A0 waits to receive some messagem0 over a network channel from B, the ini-
tiator (and hence, the intruder). As a response,A0 outputs {〈m0,m0,m0,m0〉}se
to A1 over a direct secure channel.
Intuitively,m0 represents a potential solution of T . The purpose ofA1, . . . , Am
will then be to pick four bit strings a1 = a11 . . . a
1
m, a




a31 . . . a
3
m, and a




i ∈ {0, 1} is picked by Ai for j =
1, . . . , 4. Analogously, the purpose of Am+1, . . . , A2m will be to pick four
bit strings b1 = b11 . . . b
1
m, b
2 = b21 . . . b
2
m, b
3 = b31 . . . b
3
m, and b
4 = b41 . . . b
4
m,
where bji ∈ {0, 1} is picked by Ai+m for j = 1, . . . , 4. Hence, A1, . . . , A2m





the potential solution m0. The principals are defined in such a way that
a1 = b1 = 0m, a2 = 0, and b2 = 1m, i.e., the first two positions considered in
m0 are (0, 0) and (0, 2
m − 1). Principal A2m+1 will check for these positions
whether m0[0, 0] = u0 and m0[0, 2
m − 1] = uf . Moreover, we either have
that a4 = a3 + 1 (interpreted as integers) and b3 = b4, or that a3 = a4 and
b4 = b3 + 1. In other words, the third and fourth position correspond to
two positions in m0 that are adjacent horizontally or vertically, respectively.
Principal A2m+1 will use these positions to check whether the tilings at these
positions are in a relationship in H or V , respectively.
– Principal Ai, 0 < i ≤ m, in response to the message from Ai−1, received over
a direct secure channel, sends a message to Ai+1 over a direct secure channel
according to one of the following rules which all have the same priority, say
1, and are explained below:
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
e → {〈x1, x2, x3, x4〉}
s
e,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
e → {〈x1, x2, y3, y4〉}
s
e,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
e → {〈x1, x2, x3, y4〉}
s
h,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
h → {〈x1, x2, y3, x4〉}
s
h
If Ai does not receive a message from Ai−1 in the current round, then Ai
stays in the same state by performing a self-loop which is defined to have
priority 0.
As explained above, we want that a1i = a
2
i = 0. Therefore, for the first two
messages (〈x1, y1〉 and 〈x2, y2〉), all rules pick the left components, x1 and
x2. As for the last two messages, the first two rules pick the same component.
This corresponds to choosing a3i = a
4
i . In the third rule, the first component
is picked for the third message and the second component for the fourth
message. This corresponds to choosing a3i = 0 and a
4
i = 1. Note that now
the encryption key is h (instead of e). In particular, all Aj , with i+1 ≤ j ≤ m,
can then only choose the last rule which corresponds to picking a3j = 1 and
a4j = 0. Hence, a
4 = a3 + 1.
– Principal Ai, m < i ≤ 2m, in response to the message from Ai−1, received
over a direct secure channel, sends a message to Ai+1 over a direct secure
channel according to one of the following rules which all have the same
priority, say 1, and are explained below:
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{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
e → {〈x1, x2, x3, x4〉}
s
e,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
e → {〈x1, x2, y3, y4〉}
s
e,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
h → {〈x1, x2, x3, x4〉}
s
h,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
h → {〈x1, x2, y3, y4〉}
s
h,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
e → {〈x1, x2, x3, y4〉}
s
v,
{〈〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, 〈x3, y3〉, 〈x4, y4〉〉}
s
v → {〈x1, x2, y3, x4〉}
s
v,
If Ai does not receive a message from Ai−1 in the current round, then Ai
stays in the same state by performing a self-loop which is defined to have
priority 0.
The intuition behind the rules is similar to the previous case. Here, Ai
chooses the bits b1i , . . . , b
4
i . If the message received is encrypted by h, then
this means that in the previous case two (horizontally) adjacent positions
in m0 were chosen already. So, b
3
i has to be equal to b
4
i . Otherwise, if the
message is encrypted by e, two vertically adjacent positions can be chosen.
This is done analogously to the previous case.
– A2m+1 receives a message from A2m over a direct secure channel and sends
a message to the initiator (and thus, to the intruder) over a network channel
according to one of the following rules:
{〈u0, uf , a, b〉}
s
h → c for each (a, b) ∈ H,
{〈u0, uf , a, b〉}
s
v → c for each (a, b) ∈ V ,
{〈u0, uf , a, a〉}
s
e → c for each a ∈ U.
From the explanation given above it should now be clear that the intruder has
a strategy to obtain c iff m0 encodes a solution of T , and hence, iff T has a
solution: Clearly, if T has, then the intruder can send this solution (encoded as
a message) to A0 and in any case will receive c at the end. Conversely, if m0
does not have the correct format, i.e., does not encode a binary tree as explained
above, then one of the Ai will not be able to apply a rule, and hence, the intruder
will not obtain c. If m0 is a binary tree as required but it nevertheless does not
represent a solution of T , then one of the conditions (i) to (iii) will be violated
and then there exists a choice of the A1, . . . , A2m such that A2m+1 will not be
able to apply any of the rules available.
We finally note that instead of direct secure channels one could as well use
only network channels. In this case, more keys would be used to enforce the
intruder to forward messages from one principal to the next as desired.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the AMC-model checking problem over infinite-state
concurrent games structures induced by protocols and the Dolev-Yao intruder.
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We proved that to obtain decidability it is necessary to restrict to greedy and
dssc-free protocols, which seems to be a reasonable class of protocols from a
practical point of view. For this class of protocols and the I-monotone fragment
of AMC, which contains all game-theoretic properties formulated, for example,
by Kremer and Raskin, we obtained decidability of the model checking problem
with tight complexity bounds. The complexity upper bounds were obtained by
combining techniques from the theory of infinite games and cryptographic pro-
tocol analysis in a novel and quite modular way, and hence, it is quite likely that
results for reachability properties, e.g., taking algebraic properties into account,
also carry over to our setting. The main technical question left open by our result
is whether the model checking problem is decidable also for full AMC. To ob-
tain practical implementations, it might be possible to employ constraint solving
techniques similar to those for reachability properties [3, 19]. Given the succinct-
ness of ATL∗ compared to AMC, it might also be useful to find implementations
particularly tailored to (fragments) of ATL∗ or fair ATL.
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Drielsma, P.-C. Héam, O. Kouchnarenko, J. Mantovani, S. Mödersheim, D. von
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